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Glossary 
Negotiation 
Facilitation 
Mediation 
Arbitration 
is a process in which two or more parties, without the assistance of any 
intermediary(ies), discuss/assess whether some settlement or resolution of issues of 
concern to them is possible. 
is the simplest form of assisted negotiation. The facilitator focuses almost solely 
on the process rather than volunteering his or her own ideas. 
is a process in which an impartial intermediary(ies) who is (are) acceptable to aU 
the parties facilitate(s) negotiation between disputing parties. The outcome of 
mediation mayor may not be an (enforceable) agreement. The mediator's 
involvement is more substantial than in facilitation; help is also given to devise and 
present options. 
involves a private judicial hearing of a dispute by an independent arbitrator (or 
panel of arbitrators), usually agreed to by the parties, with a view to a final 
enforceable decision being imposed on the parties. 
Adjudication involves (generally) a public hearing of a dispute before one or more judges with 
a view to a final enforceable decision made in accordance with relevant case and 
statute law being imposed on the parties (Ministry for the Environment, 198&; 
Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). 
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Summary 
This publication has responded to the Ministry for the Environment's call for research into methods 
for resolving conflict and models of partnership that are appropriate to Maori requirements and are 
conducive to iwi development and involvement in resource management. The Resource 
Management Act 1991 requires that those with functions and duties under the Act consult with the 
tangata whenua, and that they take account of the the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
New Zealand structures for resolving conflict are based on the Westminster system which was 
developed within a dominantly European setting. This system may not meet the needs of those of 
other cultures with different philosophies, norms, traditions and practices. Concerns were expressed 
in a recent study on legal services on how the public's right to participate in planning, resource 
exploitation and local body decision making appears to be seriously undermined. The situation was 
seen to be institutionally racist, with Maori participation being excluded. It was thought that too 
many judges are ignorant of or insensitive to Maori values and concerns. Adversarial proceedings 
are overly formal and intimidating. 
Mediation has been recognised in the Resource Management Act as an additional conflict resolution 
process that can be used to supplement existing processes. Mediation is and has been practised in 
many cultures. It is a process that has been used by Maori people and continues to be used in the 
present day. It is used in the family courts, in industrial relations, in international relations, and in 
the Waitangi Tribunal. 
Environmental mediation specifically has been developed and practised in North America over the 
past 15 years or so. Environmental mediation is an informal, non-adversial approach to resolving 
conflict, and parties participate voluntarily. They are free to create their own process and their own 
final agreement. Parties are encouraged to concentrate on what they value or their interests, rather 
than on positions. 
The Objective of this research was to develop a bicultural mediation process for resource 
management and environmental disputes in New Zealand. The intention was to see whether 
mediation could provide a model of partnership and a process for conflict resolution that might 
meet iwi requirements more adequately than other dispute resolution options. 
The research approach required an examination of how environmental mediation has been used in 
New Zealand to date using case studies involving Maori cultural and spiritual values. Current 
practice was to be assessed through consultation with participants in those case studies, and with 
Maori participants in the conflict resolution workshops sponsored by the Ministry for the 
Environment in 1989. The characteristics of a bicultural mediation process were to be identified 
from the studies, and a bicultural mediation process that could be applied to environmental and 
resource management disputes in New Zealand was to be developed. Criteria that could form a 
basis for future evaluation of that process were also to be developed. 
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A hui was held at the outset of this work with a group of eight Maori and two non-Maori people 
who had been involved in negotiations or were familiar with environmental issues. A Working Party 
(Te Roopu Maori) was established. Te Kaupapa 0 te wahanga Tikanga Maori (or goal) was 
formulated at the hui by Te Roopu. The primary Objective for this group was to assist the authors 
to establish a mediation process for Nga Taonga tuku iho (physical and spiritual resources) dispute 
resolution in Aotearoa that recognises te tino rangatiratanga 0 te lwi Maori. 
The Objectives set within Te Kaupapa required consultation with the tangata whenua as part of the 
process, assistance with the development of appropriate pre-negotiation procedures and 
accountability processes which implement Tikanga Maori, and assistance with the establishment of 
mediation processes which recognise and provide for the complexity and diversity of Maori society. 
The final requirement was to examine how environmental mediation has been used in New Zealand 
to date using case studies involving Maori cultural and spiritual values, and Maori claims to 
ownership of resources. 
One of the first tasks was to clarify the assumptions on which the research was to be based. 
The development of a bicultural process presupposes a measure of equity in the ability of the parties 
to participate in the process and potentially equitable control over the final outcome for the two 
Treaty partners. As only one of the parties makes the law in New Zealand and has the final say in 
any environmental mediation process, an ideal state of bicultural equity does not exist between 
Maori and non-Maori. Attitude and process applications imply that tribal definitions are inferior 
and of less significance than those of the colonial-based culture. 
It was decided that it was neither appropriate nor useful to try to develop a bicultural mediation 
process. The research effort then moved towards developing an approach to improve Maori 
effectiveness in environmental mediation as one of the necessary preliminaries to establishing a truly 
bicultural mediation process. 
In order to develop that approach it was necessary to look at the New Zealand context in which 
conflict arises over environmental and natural resource issues and in which dispute resolution occurs. 
The Treaty of Waitangi provides a starting point for discussion of that context. The English and 
Maori versions differ, and it is these differences which have driven the debate of what the Treaty 
means for environmental management in New Zealand. These different views effectively define the 
outer limits within which disputes can be resolved. 
General Maori principles have emerged as to what the Treaty means. These principles surface at 
conflict resolution fora involving Maori people. The set of Crown principles for action on the 
Treaty that emerged under the third Labour Government is very different to the set of Maori 
principles, and this difference has implications for resource management and conflict resolution. 
A third group of principles on the Treaty have developed under the Waitangi Tribunal, and these 
also have implications for resource management and conflict resolution. 
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Over the past 15 years or so a Maori perspective has been gradually incorporated into environmental 
legislation and case law. A number of key statutes can be used by iwi as fall-back position for any 
environmental mediation. Court of Appeal and High Court case law principles provide significant 
precedents for future mediation outcomes. 
Present arrangements which define the rules of the relationship between the Treaty partners fall well 
short of recognising the rangatiratanga, sovereignty, or customary authority of iwi over their natural 
resources. The relationship between Maori and the Crown is an unequal one in which the Crown 
ultimately has the final say in any legal or legislative process, because it has the power to enact laws 
or make binding decisions. 
Views vary on the effects of power imbalances between negotiating parties. An imbalance in 
negotiating expertise, unequal scientific and technical expertise, and differing access to information 
can make mediation unattractive to less powerful parties. Government organisations and private 
corporations are advantaged with a power base endowed by the existing political/economic system. 
Less powerful parties can acquire and enhance their negotiation power before and during 
negotiations if they do some careful preparation. A skilled mediator can also assist in changing the 
balance of power. 
The decision to participate in a mediation case/process depends on the circumstances of the dispute 
and the aspirations of each party. Incentives and disincentives include laws with regard to 'standing', 
whether a party has previous experience of knowledge of mediation, lack of financial resources to 
go to court, and how well parties believe their interests will be served by the approach. 
The three case studies examined in this publication reflect three levels of conflict. The first is a 
land/resource ownerShip claim by the Ruapuha hapu (Ngati Maniopoto) that had been filed with 
the Waitangi Tribunal and subsequently went to mediation. The second involved the application 
of the then Labour Government's indigenous forest policy to the forests of South Westland south 
of the Cook River. Te Koiti Turanga hapu (Tai Poutini Kai Tahu) was involved; Katiwaewae, a 
neighbouring hapu, also claimed an interest in the issue. The third case is a site-specifiC conflict in 
which the Te Atiawa people have been trying to protect their shellfish beds from local pollution. 
The key process issues to emerge for Maori that had taken part in a mediation included: who has 
the mana to be a party to the mediation, inter-iwi and intra-iwi diversity and complexity is not always 
recognised, parties appeared to play little part in defining their own process, and time was not always 
made available for Maori accountability processes to be enacted. Issues were raised regarding the 
appointment/selection of the mediator, his!her role, and skills and qualities required of the mediator. 
The studies demonstrated both positive and negative factors from an iwi perspective. Maori parties 
were given ample opportunities to express their views during mediated disputes. Those with 
negotiating experience, knowledge of the issues or an awareness of a good alternative to mediation 
felt empowered in the process. However, the absence of a 'level playing field' in the broader societal 
context was also apparent. Diversity of interest is more likely to be recognised in non-Maori rather 
than Maori concerns. Access to information was not equal for all parties nor were the resources 
available for participation. Enormous sums of money appeared to be available to bring scientific 
and technical information to the mediation setting whereas iwi representatives bringing cultural or 
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spiritual information to the negotiating table did not have access to funds. Processes were driven 
by Crown agencies and this did not assist Maori groups to advocate their own interests in the way 
they wished, or to empower them. Participation tended to be reactive rather than proactive. Tribal 
concerns were sometimes subsumed by other concerns. 
Based on the case study findings, two distinct approaches were developed to enhance iwi 
effectiveness in environmental mediation. The first was to encourage iwi to prepare a dispute 
resolution strategy (DRS). The various dispute resolution options available must be considered and 
the one most likely to achieve an outcome favoured by iwi must be chosen. 
Reasons for devising a DRS include: encouraging iwi to focus on an agreed Maori objective; 
encouraging the group to be proactive rather than reactive to initiatives or processes devised by 
others; empowering the group, within the constraints of the broader societal context within which 
mediation takes place, by encouraging it to determine for itself what is appropriate, by being 
organised and having unity of objective, purpose and vision; providing the opportunity for evaluating 
consistency with other environmental, social, cultural and economic objectives; and considering 
potential alliances in a particular dispute. 
The strategy should: state what the group wants to achieve; identify opportunities and constraints 
to achieving this outcome; evaluate the various dispute resolution options that are available, 
appropriate and 'affordable'; be flexible; and define a process for implementing and evaluating the 
agreed strategy. A basic procedure for the preparation of a DRS was outlined. 
A Maori environmental mediation strategy (EMS) is a specific plan of action that provides for more 
effective participation for iwi in environmental mediation. It is sufficiently broad in character to 
allow iwi, hapu or whanau to express their rangatiratanga as they see fit. It recognises that 
acknowledging rangatiratanga is also acknowledging the right of iwi to be diverse. An EMS was 
designed to represent a Maori response to the issues that arose in the case studies. It has been 
guided by the kaupapa outlined above. 
It was apparent from the case studies that in order to participate effectively Maori groups need to 
do a lot of preparation before they interface with non-Maori parties. A pre-pre-negotiation phase 
has been proposed in the EMS where fundamental issues with regard to participation need to be 
addressed. 
Maori requirements for mediation begin with the concept of tribal authority. Rangatiratanga is a 
statement about the existence of authority. This authority exists at various levels of the tribal 
hierarchy. Each level has its ancestral tupuna, and its defined 'patch'. Rangatiratanga recognises 
the right of the descent group to determine its own preferences on its own 'patch' without recourse 
to others outside the descent group. The descent group could be from a waka tupuna, iwi tupuna 
or hapu or whanau tupuna. 
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Manawhenua and ahi kaa define the nature of the authority, and kaitiaki defines the reciprocal 
custodial obligation to protect taonga, including natural and spiritual resources, which comes with 
the authority. The maxim is that authority without obligation is meaningless. All members of an 
iwi have manawhenua over lands and resources within their tribal rohe, compared to others who, 
because they do not descend from the iwi tupuna, do not have manawhenua. 
When the right to be party to a mediation is established it is then a case of defining how, where and 
under what circumstances the mediation should progress in a way that improves Maori effectiveness. 
Groups will identify their preferred outcome and their 'bottom line'. 
In the pre-negotiation stage decisions need to be made over who could be the mediator. 
Representatives/negotiators must be chosen in accordance with the appropriate process, and 
accountability processes must be established. Parties must also decide on their preferred approach 
to the mediation, the process they wish to establish for negotiations with the other parties, and the 
protocols they wish to negotiate with the other parties. 
Parties will also make decisions about the information they need to present to support their case 
and how that will be presented. They will identify whether they need to look for funding to assist 
them to participate. A range of possible options could be considered in advance. Maori 
representatives will ensure that they are involved in the implementation of any agreement that 
emerges from the mediation. 
One of the major questions in cross-cultural mediation is whether there can be an acceptance of 
things that are disputed (e.g. land ownership), but about which nothing can be done in a resource 
management mediation forum. The main issue is how to deal with those issues that are not 
currently resolvable. How do we achieve as much as we are able, despite the things we cannot 
achieve? 
This publication is limited in that three case studies are not a sufficient base upon which to draw 
major conclusions. Each case study illustrated a different level of dispute - a Waitangi Tribunal land 
ownership claim, a resource policy, and a site-specific dispute. An on-going evaluation of mediation 
practice in this country is needed to develop and refine a process that meets the needs of those who 
wish to participate. Criteria that can be used as a basis for future evaluation of mediation processes 
were presented. 
Recommendations arising from the research are as follows. 
1. Investigate the feasibility of establishing a nationalised conflict resolution information service 
for iwi. 
2. Investigate the feasibility of establishing a regional and local service that offers independent 
advice to iwi on conflict resolution. 
3. Investigate means by which people can find out the grounds on which Maori groups are claiming 
the right to participate, and the nature of that right. 
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4. Prepare a guide for iwi on opportunities for participation in resource management decision 
making that are provided in legislation. 
5. Investigate potential sources of funding to enable iwi to participate effectively in environmental 
mediation. 
6. Investigate changes that are needed in the Resource Management Act to ensure Maori 
effectiveness in mediation. 
7. Prepare guides on mediation for agencies and individuals that interface with iwi e.g. government 
departments, regional councils, local authorities, consent use applicants, mediators etc. 
8. Investigate methods of cross-cultural environmental information exchange in New Zealand, 
Canada and Australia. 
The findings of this publication are directed specifically at iwi. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 The problem 
The existing mono-cultural model of contlict resolution is not well-equipped to consider resource 
management disputes that are of a cross-cultural nature. It is based on the Westminster system -
a system that has been transplanted from Europe to a very different cultural context in New 
Zealand. The Westminster systems reflects Western philosophies, norms, traditions and practices 
and is not 'user friendly' to those of other cultures with different philosophies, norms, traditions and 
practices. It does not acknowledge tino rangatiratanga of the iwi to carry out resource management 
as affirmed by the Treaty of Waitangi. It sometimes faces difficulties in taking Maori environmental 
knowledge and cultural and spiritual values into account in environmental and natural resource 
management decision making. 
In 1986 the then Minister of Justice commissioned an inquiry into public needs for legal services. 
Extensive consultation was carried out with well over one thousand groups and individuals from a 
wide range of perspectives. The report that followed, Te Whainga i Te Tika: In Search of Justice 
(Advisory Committee on Legal Services, 1986), demonstrated that current legal services do not meet 
the needs of all parties. On environmental and planning services the report (pp.86-87) states that: 
"The public's right to participate in planning, resource exploitation and local body 
decisions appears to be seriously undermined, and at times nullified, by ignorance, 
cost and the intimidating nature of proceedings.... They felt the situation was 
institutionally racist, excluding Maori participation by too many judges being 
ignorant and insensitive to Maori values and concerns; overly formal, 
intimidating and inappropriately adversarial proceedings; and discriminates 
against objector groups who are unable to marshall expert evidence or assistance 
because they lack resources and money. Under present procedures people still 
felt they needed professional expertise to be effective. Maori people can rarely 
afford lawyers, and there are few who are sensitive to te tikanga Maori." 
One of the intentions of the Resource Management Law Reform was to "provide for more active 
involvement of iwi in resource management, including statutory requirements for consultation" 
(Ministry for the Environment, 1988a, p.5). Participation was to be a required outcome of the 
parallel reform of local and regional government. 
This publication has responded to the Ministry for the Environment's subsequent call for research 
into methods of contlict resolution that are appropriate to Maori requirements. The Ministry states 
that: 
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"(c)ultural conflict generally arises out of a disparity in power relations between 
tangata whenua and tauiwi (non-Maori). As a result problems of a bicultural 
nature are more often than not resolved through techniques and methods of the 
dominant culture. Research is required to consider what processes of 
consultation and models of partnership are most conducive to iwi development 
in resource management activities" (Ministry for the Environment, 1990, p.20). 
1.2 Research objective and approach 
The objective of this research as specified in the original brief was to develop a bicultural mediation 
process for resource management and environmental disputes in New Zealand. 
The research approach anticipated was to: 
_ examine how environmental mediation has been used in New Zealand to date using case studies 
involving Maori cultural and spiritual value, 
.. assess the process of "mediation" adopted in the case studies by consulting with those who were 
involved and with Maori who participated in some conflict resolution workshops (sponsored by 
the Ministry for the Environment in 1989), 
_ identify the characteristics of a bicultural mediation process, 
EO develop a bicultural mediation process that can be applied to enviromnental disputes in New 
Zealand, 
... through consultation with those identified above, develop criteria for evaluating this process. 
The Ministry for the Environment identified 10 people, eight Maori and two non-Maori (see 
acknowledgements), who had been involved in negotiations, were familiar with the performance of 
local, regional or central government in environmental issues, or worked with their own iwi on 
environmental matters, and who could be consulted with for this project. 
A hui was held with these people, and it was decided that if an attempt was being made to develop 
a cross cultural environmental mediation process it had to have the benefit of direct Maori!Pakeha 
involvement and authorship. A Working Party (Te Roopu Maori) comprising the people at the hui 
was established. The Te Kaupapa 0 te wahanga Tikanga Maori (or goal) formulated by Te Roopu 
Maori was to establish a mediation process for Nga Taonga tuku iho (physical and spiritual 
resources) dispute resolution in Aotearoa that recognises te tino rangatiratanga 0 te lwi Maori. 
Te Roopu's objectives (Nga Wbainga mo te tau 1990) were to: 
_ inform and consult with tangata whenua as part of the process, 
_ assist the development of appropriate pre-negotiation procedures and accountability processes 
which implement tikanga Maori, 
... assist to establish mediation processes that recognise and provide for the complexity and diversity 
of Maori society, 
_ examine how environmental mediation has been used in New Zealand to date using case studies 
involving Maori cultural and spiritual values, and Maori claims to ownership of resources. 
The original Objective was reassessed during the consultation process and was subsequently modified. 
It was decided that it was an inappropriate task to develop a bicultural mediation process. The 
reasons for this will be discussed below. 
The aim of this publication has focused instead on improving Maori effectiveness in mediation as 
one of the necessary preliminaries in moving towards the preferred state of a bicultural mediation 
process. By revisiting the original objective, the product of this research should more satisfactorily 
fulfil the needs of the Ministry for the Environment as stated above, as well as the needs of iwi at 
whom the findings of this research are specifically directed. 
1.3 Bicultural mediation - fundamental assumptions 
Mediation is a process that has been used by Maori people and continues to be used in the present 
day. The face-to-face dialogue that is an integral part of the mediation process mirrors the 
traditional Maori decision-making process (Maurice Gray, Centre for Resource Management, 
pers. comm.). The principle of kotahitanga, that is, Maori political process, "is directed towards the 
necessity of reaching unity through consensus (sic) ... Maaori political process is designed to 
recognise individuals and include all their concerns even if in the end they do not get their own way" 
(Ritchie, 1986. p.30). 
Mediation is used in the family courts (Family Proceedings Act 1980, Children, Young Persons and 
Their Families Act 1989), in industrial relations (Labour Relations Act 1987) and in international 
relations. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (1988 amendments to the Second Schedule) confer on 
the Waitangi Tribunal the power to refer claims to mediation .. The Waitomo claim was the first to 
be mediated, followed by the Taemaro land claim and the Takaporewa (Stephens Island) claims. 
One of the outcomes of the Resource Management Law Reform has been to introduce the 
opportunity for additional conflict resolution processes to supplement existing planning application 
and resource consent-granting procedures under the Resource Management Act 1991. Section 99(1) 
states "For the purpose of clarifying, mediating, or facilitating resolution of any matter of issue, a 
consent authority may, upon request or of its own motion, invite anyone who has made an 
application for a resource consent or a submission on an application to meet with each other or 
such persons as the authority thinks fit." Section 268(1) states "At any time after lodgement of any 
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proceedings, for the purpose of encouraging settlement, the Planning Tribunal, with the consent of 
the parties and of its own motion or upon request, may ask one of its members or another person 
to conduct mediation, conciliation, or other procedures before or at any time during the course of 
a hearing." 
The practice of mediation as specified in the Resource Management Act is both similar to and 
different from the forms of mediation referred above. The major similarity is the intervention of 
a neutral third party who assists the parties to reach agreement between or amongst themselves. 
In other forms of mediation, there may only be two opposing parties involved, and the issues 
relatively clear cut. In environmental mediation, on the other hand, there may be several or many 
stakeholders who claim that they will be affected by any final outcome. The issues to be addressed 
tend to be complex in that they may revolve around concepts of risk, uncertainty, irreversibility, and 
cultural and spiritual values, as well as the spread of costs and benefits, for example. 
Environmental mediation, as it is commonly referred to, has been developed and practised in North 
America over the past 15 years or so, and to a limited extent in Australia. Trainers from North 
America are introducing this model to future mediation practitioners in New Zealand. The long-
term aim is to develop our own indigenous practice in New Zealand that reflects our particular 
cultural context; a practice that embodies and values the different requirements of both a tribal 
culture and a Western/colonial culture. 
The flexibility of mediation means it has a powerful potential to facilitate the resolution of 
cross-cultural disputes. The parties create their own process, negotiate the initial protocols according 
to their cultural needs, determine the agenda, define the issues that are of fundamental concern to 
each, and decide upon the terms of the final agreement. Under mediation, Maori cultural and 
spiritual values and traditional Maori environmental monitoring knowledge can be expressed more 
readily in resource management decision making than they are under existing processes. 
However, to try to develop a bicultural environmental mediation process is not appropriate. By 
definition, the term bicultural infers the coexistence of two cultures. In New Zealand it is most 
commonly taken, in its simplest form, to refer to the existence of a Maori culture and a so-called 
Pakeha (predominantly European, predominantly British) culture, as the two main signatories to the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 
The term bicultural, however, is su~ject to many varying interpretations. These can range from (in 
its rarest form) equitable political power sharing, to varying degrees of incorporation (or indeed non-
incorporation) of a Maori perspective into any particular endeavour. 
There are, however, some key components. 'Bicultural' implies the existence of a true, fair, and just 
partnership between the two cultures. The authors believe that bicultural implies, in its clearest 
expression with respect to resource management: 
1. The sharing of legislative-making and decision-making power between Maori and Crown (and 
those agents to which it delegates authority such as regional and local government) in all aspects 
of natural and physical resource management. 
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2. The active protection of Maori interests in their lands, waters and natural resources, including 
those in Maori legal title, those that have been confiscated, whether by compulsory acquisition 
or presumption of ownership or management, and those that are valued for cultural, spiritual, 
social or economic reasons by Maori. 
3. Equitable control over all resource management processes. 
The notion of a fair bicultural mediation process presupposes a measure of equity in the ability to 
participate in the process and potentially equitable control over the final outcome for the two 
cultures concerned. This equity cannot be achieved while only one of the parties has the authority 
to make laws and ultimately to determine preferences in respect of environmental management. It 
cannot be achieved while the values of the other party (the tangata whenua) are accorded a 
subordinate expression in the institutional arrangements relating to resource management. 
In addition, there is incongruency with the scope of analysis, perceptions and practical application 
in the daily lives of the people who are most affected by existing processes. This incongruency tends 
to be manifested in attitude and process application which imply that tribal definitions are inferior 
and of less significance than those of the colonial-based culture. To introduce a 'bicultural 
mediation' process into this scenario will produce more of the same disorder rather than provide 
a new direction for positive growth. On the one hand a 'bicultural mediation' process will satisfy 
the process-oriented mechanisms of one culture while at the same time putting up 'another 
patronising process' by the other culture. 
It is possible that a mediation process provided by the hegemony could provide more effective 
participation than is presently experienced. The key issues will be whether tribal people, in this case, 
Maori, are accorded justice, and that their culture and integrity is not compromised in the 
competitive process of mediation that will emerge. It is this 'competitive' element that adds another 
factor to the dilemma of a 'bicultural mediation' process. 
At present, one culture has the distinct advantage of being in control of the powerful mechanisms 
for change and/or maintenance of the status quo, and the other culture, while having the justifiable 
aspirations for power, does not have the resource infrastructures to even begin to be on a par in a 
mediation process. 
An examination of the present processes, which are colonial-based, is needed to eliminate the non-
effective activities. In other words, look at what works from a Maori perspective, and strengthen 
this, and eliminate what does not work. At best this should provide a positive process to build from 
whether this be Maori or Pakeha participation. 
1.4 Research approach revisited 
The approach taken to finding ways of improving Maori effectiveness in environmental mediation, 
as a preliminary step towards a bicultural mediation process required an outline of the New Zealand 
context in which conflict arises and disputes resolution occurs. The next task was to look at 
environmental mediation as it has been practised in North America to see: 
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a) whether it is appropriate for New Zealand's cultural environment, and 
b) to use the analysis as a framework within which to identify issues arising for Maori participants 
in the case studies. The findings from the case studies were then used to prescribe a strategy 
intended to improve Maori effectiveness in environmental mediation. Criteria were also 
developed with which to monitor future mediation practice. 
The publication structure traces the development of these steps. 
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CHAPTER lWO 
Context for resolving environmental disputes 
2.1 Treaty of Waitangi 
The Treaty of Waitangi provides a starting point for discussion of the New Zealand context for 
resolving environmental disputes. 
The Treaty was signed in 1840 between representatives of the British Crown and numerous chiefs 
(as representatives of various tribes and hapu in New Zealand). The two versions, however, differ 
and it is these differences in perception, interpretation, expectation, and dishonoured Crown 
guarantees, that have driven the debate in New Zealand. A copy of the Treaty is attached to this 
publication as Appendix 1. 
In the English version, sovereignty was ceded from the chiefs to the Queen of England on the 
understanding that the chiefs were guaranteed full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their 
lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other properties as long as it was their wish and desire. 
In the Maori 'translation', however, the chiefs only ceded kawanatanga (or governance of their lands) 
to the Queen of England on the grounds that the retention of their tino rangatiratanga or higher 
authority over their lands, villages and '0 ratou taonga katoa' (everything which they value) would 
be guaranteed. 
2.1.1 Maori principles 
The different views on what the Treaty means 'in a contemporary context' effectively define the outer 
limits within which dispute resolution takes places. The ground between these two outer limits can 
be defined as 'negotiation space'. 
The Treaty unquestionably guaranteed Maori that absolute authority over their natural resources 
would be recognised and provided for by the Crown. Since its signing there has been a successive 
stripping away of this customary authority. In recent legislative, legal, and institutional approaches 
to the natural environment, however, the Crown has been reassessing this notion of absolute 
authority. 
The Treaty is the founding constitutional document for this country. It provides the Crown with the 
authority to govern its own subjects, and guarantees Maori absolute authority over many things 
including their natural resources. It also brought with it a reasonable expectation that in delegating 
any of its own (i.e. Crown) authority to others such as local and regional government these 
guarantees would be provided for. It did not provide the basis for the subjugation of Maori by the 
Crown, local or regional government in the ownership and management of Maori natural resources. 
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All parties to an environmental conflict resolution process involving iwi need to be aware of Maori 
expectations in respect of the Treaty and natural resources. These expectations are real and 
continue to the present day. While they are not matched by equivalent legislative recognition, and 
while the majority of natural resources have been wrestled from Maori ownership, obligations of 
tangata whenua as kaitiaki to protect these resources and encourage their wise management remain. 
The signing of the Treaty has given rise to continual debate not only between Maori and Pakeha, 
Maori and Crown, but within the various parties themselves. The internal Maori debate has been 
extensive. There are also inherent dangers in defining Treaty principles, and many Maori have either 
opposed such generalisations or reserved their positions. Yet some prominent themes are being 
consistently stated by Maori at various fora around the country including the Waitangi Tribunal, the 
High Court, the Planning Tribunal, Maori submissions to resource management legislation, local 
government hearings on district schemes, and resource use consents and so on. 
The themes and the way they are expressed depend considerably on the detail surrounding the 
particular issue, and are subject to substantial variation amongst and even within different iwi and 
Maori groupings. In general they are: 
_ The principle of iwi sovereignty 
The Treaty was a contractual agreement between the Crown and a Confederation of sovereign 
iwi nations, and was tacit recognition by the Crown of legitimate iwi sovereignty. It affirmed te 
tino rangatiratanga (highest authority) 0 te iwi Maori, and ceded kawanatanga (governance, or 
the right to make laws) to the Crown with the proviso that te tino rangatiratanga of the iwi 
would be retained. 
This principle o( iwi sovereignty had also been earlier confirmed in the signing of the Declaration 
of Independence 1835 between the Crown and numerous rangatira in 1837. 
.. The principle of tino rangatiratanga over iwi resources 
Article 2 of the Treaty specifically guaranteed retention of the iwi's right to exercise full or 
absolute authority over, and possession of, their natural, physical, cultural, spiritual resources and 
other taonga. 
_ The principle of explicit consent 
Articles 2 of both the Maori and English text of the Treaty stated that full or absolute authority 
over, and possession of, iwi resources could only be extinguished by explicit consent of the iwi. 
_ The principle of active involvement 
The Treaty implicitly recognised the right of the iwi to exercise their own sovereign power over 
their taonga. 
These principles have significant consequences for how conflict is resolved because they imply: 
the right of each iwi to speak for itself, 
the right of each iwi to determine its own preferences without recourse to anyone else, 
the right of each iwi to be diverse, 
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2.1.2 
the notion that each iwi has an equivalent status to the Crown and that issues in respect 
of resource management need to be dealt with at the level of iwi to Crown, 
the right of iwi to exercise full authority over its taonga, 
the notion that natural resources (for example seabed, waterways, harbours, fish, 
confiscated lands, minerals, airways and so on) which have not been explicitly transferred 
to non-iwi agencies, still rightfully belong to the iwi, 
the right of each iwi to be involved (at the very least) in resource management issues that 
affect their interests in a manner which acknowledges that the iwi's authority flows from 
the Treaty and/or its sovereignty as an iwi, rather than from the much lesser status of 
'interest group'. 
Crown principles 
The principles that the Crown has extrapolated from the Treaty, however, are quite different to 
those discussed above. The Crown's presumption of its right to carry out resource management 
under the Treaty is being defined through direct Crown statement, and various legal fora over 
resources under the rangatiratanga of the iwi (Appendix 2). 
In 1989 the third Labour Government defined a set of principles for Crown action on the Treaty. 
These principles were intended to guide the Crown's behaviour in its dealings with any issues arising 
out of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
The important signals they give for iwi/Crown, or indeed any iwi/Crown agent (such as local and 
regional government) involved in conflict resolution process are: 
_ The Crown has the right to make laws and to govern. 
It does so on the understanding that it (the Crown) has sovereignty and will allocate an 
'appropriate' priority to any Maori interest. 
.. The notion of rangatiratanga is reduced to a limited concept of iwi self-management. 
This self-management must take place within the confines of the laws established by the Crown. 
_ The need for reasonable co-operation between iwi and the Crown. 
The issues of how the concept of reasonableness is to be gauged, or the role of the iwi in 
determining what constitutes a fair standard of reasonableness, is not addressed. 
_ The Crown has a responsibility to establish processes for effecting appropriate redress for any 
grievance. 
The act of redress must not create a fresh injustice. Once again the role of the iwi in weighting the 
grievance and proposed redress against any fresh injustice is not stated. 
These principles clearly signal to iwi that any conflict resolution process involving the Crown or any 
of its agents empowered under legislation to make resource management decisions still puts the final 
authority with the Crown or its agents, in the sense that they either have the authority to enact and 
change resource management law, or delegate decision-making authority to other agents. 
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Whilst these statements may be defined as Crown principles there is no guarantee that the Crown 
will act on them, nor is there any assurance that the principles will be interpreted in the way 
intended, or given effect to by local and regional government. However, the converse may also be 
true. There could be considerable merit in fostering links between iwi and Crown and local and 
regional authorities who may not only act on these principles but also seek to strengthen these 
principles. 
It is, nevertheless, crucial that iwi are aware of, and use, the various legislative and legal imperatives 
that currently exist to strengthen any involvement they may have in these processes. 
2.1.3 Waitangi Tribunal principles 
Since its establishment in 1975 to examine breaches of the Treaty by the Crown, the Waitangi 
Tribunal has itself developed a new franchise for protecting Maori interests and defining Crown 
obligations to give effect to the Treaty, particularly with respect to the use of natural resources. 
The various principles that have been developed by the Tribunal need to be assessed for their 
possible use by any iwi approaching a conflict resolution proceeding with non-iwi groups, and as a 
gauge of what the Tribunal itself considers is fair and reasonable. Most claims taken to the Tribunal 
have dealt with the issue of resource management. 
A cautionary note, however, needs to be sounded. The Waitangi Tribunal only has powers of 
recommendation, and these recommendations are not binding on the Crown. The Crown has not 
acted on the majority of the recommendations made to it to date (Palmer, 1991, p.2). 
In many respects it may suit the Crown to force or encourage disputes into the Tribunal because it 
then does not have to deal directly with them, at least immediately. It may not, however, suit Maori. 
Other less circuitous routes to the other partner such as direct negotiation with the Crown and/or 
taking cases to the court, may be more efficient and indeed productive. 
In the various claims that have been taken to the Tribunal however (Appendix 3) some key 
principles have been consistently stated. These include: 
The principle of rangatiratanga or tribal authority 
The tribe is a legitimate authority, and while the Treaty gave the Crown the right to govern 
(Kawanatanga) it was on the understanding that Maori tribal authority (Rangatiratanga) over the 
resources would be recognised and respected.-
The principle of active protection 
In return for ceding the right to make law, the Crown was given the obligation actively to protect 
Maori interests in these resources. The Crown responsibility is not only one of active protection 
of Maori interests and values in their natural resources, but the giving of a priority to these when 
they are adversely affected (Wai 8 Manukau Claim, p.78). 
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The principle of consistent delegation 
"The Crown cannot divest itself of its Treaty obligations by conferring an inconsistent jurisdiction 
on ... other judicial or non-judicial bodies" (Wai 9 Orakei Claim, p.149). 
When the Crown delegates responsibility to other bodies that act on its behalf, such as district or 
regional councils, it must ensure that Treaty obligations are passed down as well. 
The principle of partnership based on good faith 
"The Treaty signifies a partnership between the Crown and the Maori people and the compact 
between them rests on the precis that each partner will act reasonably and in the utmost good faith 
towards the other" (Wai 9 Orakei Claim, p.150). 
This partnership is an evolving one, and the "Treaty is capable of a measure of adaptation to meet 
new and changing circumstances provided there is a measure of consent and an adherence to its 
broad principles" (Wai 6 Motonui Claim, p.61). 
The Tribunal is, in many respects, acting as a mediator between Crown and iwi. It is, however, a 
serious impediment to Maori aspirations in that one of the parties i.e. the Crown, receives a 
recommendation from a tribunal which it has set up itself and then the Crown, not the Tribunal, 
decides what action, if any, should be taken to address the iwi's grievance. In addition to this 
general obligation to mediate between iwi and Crown, the Tribunal has the power to refer claims 
to mediation by a member of the Tribunal or another person (Clause 94[1] 2nd schedule). The 
mediator is under a duty to use his or her best endeavour to bring about a settlement of the claim 
(Clause 9B), but nothing however binds the parties to negotiate in good faith. 
2.2 Environmental legislation and case law 
The period since the mid-1970s has seen the steady incorporation of a Maori perspective into 
legislation dealing with the management of natural resources. 
While the new legislative franchise for attempting to accommodate Maori interests into resource 
management continues to fall well short of Maori expectations referred to earlier, it is nevertheless 
developing in a positive rather than negative direction. 
2.2.1 Key environmental statutes 
The key statutes that can be used by iwi as a fall-back position for any environmental mediation are 
briefly summarised in Appendix 4 to this publication and include: 
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Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975 
Fisheries Act, 1983 
Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act, 1985 
State Owned Enterprises Act, 1986 
Environment Act, 1986 
Conservation Act, 1987 
Maori Language Act, 1987 
Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act, 1988 
Maori Fisheries Act, 1989 
Transit New Zealand Act, 1989 
Crown Forests Assets Act, 1989 
Foreshore and Seabed Endowment Revesting Bill, 1989. 
Depending on the nature of the particular dispute, iwi should attempt to canvass fully the various 
legislative opportunities available to it when developing strategies to deal with an environmental 
dispute. 
Resource Management Act 1991 
The Act seeks to integrate all the current laws (approximately 21 statutes) dealing with management 
of resources, including the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, the Water and Soil Conservation 
Act 1%7, the Mining Act 1971, the Coal Mines Act 1979, the Harbours Act 1950, and the Clean 
Air Act 1979. 
Its purpose is sustainable management of natural resources, and it uses national policy statements, 
regional policy statements and plans, regional and district plans and resource consents to prescribe 
this. Powers and obligations to carry out resource management are granted primarily to local 
authorities, regional councils, the Planning Tribunal and various government departments. 
A collective submission to Supplementary Order Paper 22 on the Bill by the National Maori 
Congress, New Zealand Maori Council and Maori Womens Welfare League (May 1991) stated as 
follows: 
"Finally, the bill contemplates delegation of the Crown functions as the primary 
resource manager to regional and local government agencies with iwi performing 
a subordinate and at times, almost invisible role. Maori view this abrogation by 
the Crown of its Treaty responsibilities with grave concern. At the least, 
appropriately resourced iwi structures (which have existed for many centuries) 
should be permitted to function on an equal footing with local authorities." 
The Act does not recognise the status and absolute authority of the iwi to make management 
decisions about resources within its tribal territory. It does contain many provisions which will both 
have an impact on Maori use of resources and Maori values associated with the environment. 
While the Act does not recognise the tino rangatiratanga of the iwi to carry out resource 
management over its own resources, its provision contained within it dealing with Maori interest 
should be evaluated for its use in seeking to achieve Maori environmental objectives. 
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Various provisions within the Resource Management Act are intended to achieve environmental 
objectives (Appendix 5). 
2.2.2 Relevant case law 
Court of Appeal case law 
The Court of Appeal in two recent landmark cases (New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney 
General 1987, CA 54/87; MaJ:mta v. Attorney General 1989; CA 129.89) has brought the Treaty 
into the core of the New Zealand legal system by defining a series of principles of the Treaty that 
are enforceable at law if expressly recognised by statute. In so doing, it has expanded the negotiating 
territory within which more effective resolution of conflicts is possible. 
Principles defined by the Court in the New Zealand Maori Council case included: 
.. the importance of a partnership in government between the Maori and Pakeha, based on 
reciprocal reasonableness and the utmost good faith towards each other (Cooke, J. p.44). 
'" the duty of the Crown actively to protect Maori people in the use of their lands and their waters 
to the fullest extent practicable (Cooke, J. p.37), 
... the obligation of the Crown to redress any past breaches of the Treaty (Somers, J. p.30), 
... the principle of express Maori consent, that the Treaty guaranteed Maori full exclusive and 
undisturbed possession of their property for as long as they wished to retain it (Somers, J. p.20). 
... the concept of rangatiratanga as meaning iwi self-management. 
The Court in the Mahuta case stated: 
"Reparation has to be made to the Maori people for past and continuing breaches 
of the Treaty by which they agreed to yield government. Lip service disclaimers 
of racial prejudice and token aCknowledgements that the Treaty has not been 
honoured cannot be enough. An obligation has to be seen to be honoured" 
(Cooke, J.). 
In what also basically amounted to a reprimand for the Crown in its attempts to circumvent its own 
legislation, Justice Cooke signalled the message that: "In the end no doubt only the courts can 
finally rule on whether or not a particular solution accords with Treaty principles". 
The message for iwi particularly in this last statement is that some environmental disputes involving 
fundamental Maori rights and interests or an extreme conflict of values may be more appropriately 
dealt with by direct recourse to the courts. The courts have the ability to make binding judgements 
in a particular dispute and also to set a precedent for other environmental disputes involving similar 
conflicts, thereby improving Maori negotiating strength. 
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The background to these cases is included in this publication (Appendix 6). 
High Court case law 
Significant High Court cases include Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries (H. C., CHCH M662/85) 1985; 
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society v. WA. Habgood (H.C.[M655/86]) 1986; and Hualdna 
Development Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority v. Bowater, 1986 (M430!86). 
Te Weehi Case 
The Court held that the right to take fish was not related to the ownership of the foreshore of the 
seabed, but a customary Maori fishing right provided for by the Treaty of Waitangi, and that 
customary rights do not require legislation to be recognised, but to be extinguished. 
Habgood Case 
The Court held that 'ancestral land' for the purposes of Section 3 (1 )(g) of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1977 was not restricted to land in Maori ownership: 
"Ancestral lands means land which has been owned by ancestors." "What is 
required to be determined is the relationship of the Maori people and their 
culture and traditions with their ancestral land." 
Prior to this the Planning Tribunal has consistently rejected the notion that ancestral land meant 
simply that, irresp~tive of legal tenure. 
Huakina Case 
The Court held that while the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1%7 lacked specific recognition of 
Maori spiritual and cultural values associated with water, such values could not be excluded from 
consideration when making decisions on a water right application "if the evidence established the 
existence of spiritual, cultural and traditional relationships with natural water held by a particular 
and significant group of Maori" (Chillwell, J. p.80). 
Justice Chillwell also held that "There can be no doubt that the Treaty is a part of the fabric of New 
Zealand society ... " and that it is proper to resort to "extrinsic material" such as the Treaty and 
decisions of the Waitangi Tribunal when making deliberations. Prior to this decision Maori values 
had been rejected as irrelevant. 
The important message for iwi is that there may be some disputes that can only be resolved in the 
courts because legislation, case law or the conventional wisdom simply do not allow otherwise. 
The benefit in seeking resolution of these disputes through the courts is that, if successful in a Maori 
sense, they not only 'create' a negotiating opportunity but also increase the negotiating strength of 
Maori in other similar disputes. 
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There is, however, also a downside to going to court. It costs money and time. There is obviously 
no guarantee that a case will be won and that a beneficial Maori precedent will be set. Conversely 
there is even a possibility that negative Maori precedents will be created, which ends up diminishing 
Maori negotiating strength. 
In many respects, therefore, there are many advantages to exhausting 'other' resolution possibilities 
before going to court. However, the costs as well as the benefits of going to court need to be 
weighed up before deciding on a particular strategy for action. 
2.3 Institutional reform 
In the last few years the Crown has carried out two major institutional reforms that will have a 
significant impact on Maori people and the environment. 
2.3.1 Local governnrent reform 
Local government reforms were initiated in 1988 and have considerable consequences for Maori 
political and administrative participation in local and regional government, where the majority of 
resource management decisions will still be made. There:is no provision for direct election of Maori 
members or iwi representatives to local or regional government (except the Auckland Regional 
Council). Current provision for tangata whenua representation on Regional and Maritime Planning 
Committees, under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 has disappeared with the passing of 
the Resource Management Act 1991. 
A draft Local Government Amendment Bill (No.8) requiring the establishment of Maori Advisory 
Committees by regional councils and local authorities was circulated in 1990. However, the new 
National Government has not as yet indicated what it intends to do with the draft Bill. Despite this, 
many local authorities and regional councils have established Maori Advisory Committees. While 
such committees have the potential to act as advocates for Maori interests they have been met with 
a mixed reception from some iwi who are concerned that these committees will diminish their full 
authority and sovereignty. Such committees, however, can be used as an important advocate and 
ally in seeking to achieve particular iwi environmental objectives. 
However, the lack of provision for direct political representation and, therefore, input by the iwi into 
local and regional government heighten the importance of other forms of conflict resolution to 
attempt reconciliation of differences between iwi and local government. 
2.3.2 Resource Management Law Reform 
The Act identifies local and regional government as the main institutions for carrying out resource 
management and making resource management decisions. Statutory recognition is not given to iwi, 
as of right, to make decisions about resources over which they have full authority. 
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The only instances in which iwi can legislatively exercise its authority are where such functions 
(except approval of policy statements, plans, and requirements for heritage protection) are delegated 
to it by the local authority (Section 33), and where the Minister for Conservation grants the 
authority to act as a Heritage Protection Authority (Section 188). 
In view of this limited scope for iwi to act as resource management agencies and decision makers 
it is crucial that they be equipped to use various dispute resolution processes to reconcile differences 
between themselves and resource consent agencies such as territorial authorities. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Environmental mediation 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the development of environmental mediation overseas (North America in 
particular), and its appropriateness for New Zealand. In particular, an approach that is being 
introduced to future mediation practitioners by trainers from North America is assessed. This 
analysis is then used as a framework to identify the issues that have arisen for Maori participants 
in three case studies involving the mediation of resource ownership, policy and management disputes 
in New Zealand (Chapter Four). The character of this model of mediation, its potential benefits 
and limitations are described, as wen as the outline of a general environmental mediation process. 
This general process is not unique to mediation. The basic phases are universal to many human 
activities carried out at an individual, group. community or national level. The phases include 
preparation, action or decision making, and the putting into effect of whatever is decided. The 
uniqueness of mediation in a formal conflict resolution sense is that the parties are free to design 
a process that meets the needs of all involved throughout each· phase. 
Environmental mediation is generally a voluntary, collaborative, joint prOblem-solving approach to 
decision making that is based on dialogue and communication. A neutral third-party is closely 
involved to assist parties to reach consensus agreements that are mutually acceptable to all through 
negotiation and bargaining. 
The mediation approach is completely informal and much less intimidating when compared with the 
formality of the Tribunal system. Parties are not bound by rules of procedure but are free to create 
their own process. They bargain with each other and attempt to make trade-offs which do not 
compromise their own fundamental interests or values. 
3.2 Environmental mediation G its potential 
The underlying strategy used by a skilled mediator is to move parties away from what each of them 
wants towards what each of them values. Mediation encourages a search for shared and compatible 
interests behind the opposing 'public positions' parties may hold. In this way, people may be willing 
to 'sacrifice' certain things that are not of major importance to them while working towards 
addressing their fundamental concerns in the final agreement. 
Mediation offers a means for more appropriate values to be articulated in the processes of 
communication and settlement. It might be argued that adjudication embodies and represents the 
values of rules, contests and zero-sum resolution, while mediation may embody the values of 
interests, settlement and positive-sum outcomes. 
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The adversarial or judicial approach used in the Planning Tribunal requires disputes to be 'fitted' 
into a legal framework and "(c)oncerns that 'really matter' to those affected by the decision of the 
court or tribunal may not be legally relevant and may necessarily be excluded from consideration by 
the decision-maker" (Ministry for the Environment, 1988c, p.5). On the other hand, mediation 
provides a non-adversarial forum where cultural and spiritual values can be expressed, and attempts 
made to show how scientific and technical solutions may not always be relevant to Maori concerns. 
Because the parties negotiate their own process and their own final agreement, the conflict has a 
good chance of being resolved. One of the outcomes that could be expected is the reaching of an 
agreement that is acceptable to all the parties involved. When parties 'own' their agreement they 
are more likely to ensure that it remains stable long enough to be implemented. Even if parties do 
not reach agreement they have met each other face-to-face to state their concerns in a 
non-adversarial way. Improving relationships between parties is very important in a small country 
such as New Zealand. 
Access to mediation may be easier than it is to other dispute resolution options/models. Any party 
who believes that they would be affected by decisions made with regard to a particular resource can 
participate. It is in the interests of all parties to allow all views to be represented because a party 
that is prevented from participating has the potential to undermine any agreement that is reached. 
Mediation can cost substantially less than alternatives such as the courts. Crippling legal costs can 
be avoided because lawyers are not required to prepare extensive cases nor to appear in court on 
behalf of their clients. Parties could expect to share costs for the services of the mediator and to 
pay to bring their own information to the mediation table. The mediator may co-ordinate a resource 
pool that all parties can draw upon. 
There are two dimensions to the question of time with regard to mediation. As mediation can, 
theoretically, take place at any time, lengthy delays often associated with the Planning Tribunal can 
be avoided. As soon as a dispute is 'ripe' a mediator can gain entry and begin. However, there are 
no guidelines as to how long a mediated agreement might take to reach; it could be very quick, or 
it could take a year or more. The presence of a deadline can influence the time taken, but many 
factors affect the speed at which problem solving can occur. 
It is prudent for parties to work in accordance with relevant statute and case law. If not, it is likely 
the final agreement would not be granted a consent order by the Planning Tribunal. Legal counsel 
can playa role in mediation by advising their clients as to what might be a safe course of action. 
Alternatively, the parties may choose an independent legal counsel at the outset to advise the whole 
group and ensure the final agreement is acceptable to the Planning Tribunal. 
Suggested texts for the interested reader include: Bingham (1986), Susskind and Cruickshank (1987) 
and Blackford (1990). 
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3.3 Environmental mediation - its limitations? 
Views vary on the effects of power imbalances between parties and whether mediation can be an 
effective means of dispute resolution where that occurs. Daniel McCool (1991) looks at the issue 
of Indian water rights in the United States and questions whether negotiated settlements are 
appropriate for those kinds of conflict situations. He (ibid., p.3) cites one view that is equally 
relevant to mediation. 
"Negotiations potentially offer Indian and non-Indian entities more timely 
clarification of water rights, in an non-adversarial setting, and give all parties 
greater control over the eventual outcome. However, negotiations are not a 
panacea. Unless basic conditions are present concerning the power differentials 
between the negotiating entities, the existence of a power base from which to 
negotiate, and the entities' ability (sic) to understand and advocate their own 
interests, negotiations may not be an effective dispute resolution (sic) mechanism 
(Simon, 1989, p.2)". 
Government organisations and private corporations are endowed with power and influence by the 
existing political/economic system. However, other groups generally have to develop their power 
resources on a situation-by-situation basis (Cormick, 1987, p.314). When fundamental power 
differentials exist between parties, mediation does not take place on what is popularly referred to 
as 'a level playing field'. The power imbalances that exist between parties in the wider 
political/economic sphere are transplanted to the dispute resolution forum. 
Power differentials can be manifested in an imbalance in negotiating expertise. Inexperienced 
negotiators can be 'taken to the cleaners' by highly experienced and sophisticated opponents. When 
inequities in negotiating expertise are coupled with the very informal atmosphere of negotiations 
sessions, it may lead to some parties agreeing to unjust settlements - settlements they might not have 
agreed to in a more adversarial setting. 
Unequal scientific and technical expertise may be even more problematic in environmental 
mediation. Disputes may centre on exact environmental effects of particular pollutants or 
development activities. Those groups that are best able to mobilise expertise and research are in 
a more powerful position at the negotiating table. These same groups may also have sole access to 
technical information about industrial processes while others do not (Amy, 1990, pp.223-224). 
Fisher (1983, pp.149-166) describes ways for parties to acquire negotiation power before and during 
negotiation, and how to use the power a party already has. Negotiating power is the ability to 
influence others, and it depends on many factors. Fisher describes six categories of power (the 
"negotiator" means the party's representative, not the mediator). 
1. The power of skill and knowledge 
"(A) skilled negotiator is better able to influence the decision of others than is an unskilled 
negotiator (p.153)." Negotiating skills can be both learned and taught. Skills include those of 
dealing with people; those of analysiS, logic and the ability to organise ideas. A powerful 
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negotiator is a knowledgeable one; is familiar with negotiating styles and cultural differences, 
and with examples or precedents to persuade others. Knowledge relevant to the particular 
negotiation (on the other parties, the issues, and the facts) strengthens a negotiator's entering 
posture. 
2. The power of a good relationship 
A good working relationship with other parties enhances a party's negotiating power. It may be 
even more important than any particular outcome. Trust, and the ability to communicate easily 
and effectively are the two most critical elements. A negotiator who has a reputation for 
honesty, integrity and commitment has the capacity to exert significant influence. 
3. The power of a good alternative to negotiation 
A negotiator's power depends, to a significant extent, on how well he or she can do for 
him/herself if they walk away from the mediation. In preparing for mediation, it is a good idea 
to consider the alternatives to reaching agreement with the other party(ies). If the negotiator 
works to improve this alternative to the extent possible, the alternative sets a floor or bottom 
line. The better an alternative that can be developed, the greater power accrues to the 
negotiator to affect favourably a negotiated outcome. 
4. The power of an elegant solution 
"One way to influence the other side in a negotiation is to invent a good solution to that 
problem ... When preparing for a mediation, a wise negotiator would work out a range of 
options that would meet the legitimate interests of both or all sides. This strategy increases the 
chances of affecting the outcome favourably. 
5. The power of legitimacy 
The power of legitimacy is the power to convince others that a particular result is fair, that the 
law requires it, because it is consistent with precedent or policy considerations, or because it 
complies with a particular objective standard. 
The fact that a consent order would have to be sought from the Planning Tribunal, or that a 
party could take the dispute to the Tribunal if they perceived any agreement reached to be 
unfair, illegal, inconsistent with precedent or policy considerations etc. puts a particular light on 
this source of power in New Zealand. 
Parties may choose to employ a lawyer to advise them on legal issues, or have at least researched 
precedents, expert opinion etc. in advance of the process. 
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6. The power of commitment 
Fisher presents two different kinds of commitments. 
Affirmative commitments consist of an offer of what the negotiator is willing to agree to, or, 
failing agreement, what he or she is willing to do under certain conditions. A positive 
commitment is an offer and this enhances the negotiator's power. 
Negative commitments imply an unwillingness to make certain agreements (even though they 
would be better than no agreements), or a threat that if the agreement fails the negotiator will 
engage in certain negative conduct. This form of power should be used as a last resort. The 
earlier a negative commitment is made, the less likely it is that a negotiator has maximized the 
cumulative total of the other forms of negotiating power. 
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, p.135) discuss how the formation of coalitions is another source of 
power that can be drawn upon where appropriate. 
Burgess (1983, p.20S) argues that mediation cannot redistribute power, and if a party believes it will 
lose power they are not likely to participate. On the other hand Chart (Senior Lecturer, Law 
Department, University of Canterbury, pers. comm.) proposes that the power balance is never static 
in mediation and that it can be changed by the presence of a mediator. If the power balance is 
unequal the mediator has to decide if and how he/she will help the weaker party. Some argue that 
a mediator is obliged to create just settlements and should therefore help to empower the weaker 
party. 
Others claim that if a mediator attempts to influence the power relations between disputing parties 
it colours the mediator's impartiality. The mediator's function would move dangerously close to 
advocacy (Moore, p.34). 
The question of establishing trust between or amongst the parties is a critical factor that can 
undermine a mediation (refer to 'Good faith' mediation in Table 3.2). 
Each party will weigh up the kinds of issues and factors described above when they are making a 
decision about whether to consider mediation. The mediator also carries out a conflict assessment 
as the weightings will be different for individual disputes. He or she would then assess the potential 
for resolving each case on its merits. However, the potential of mediation can only be fully realised 
if the parties involved have the ability to understand and advocate their own interests. 
(Numerous authors have documented case studies that illustrate how these issues fare in practice. 
The interested reader should refer to Lake (1987), Sullivan (1984), Talbot (1983), Crowfoot and 
Wondolleck (1990». 
3.4 Environmental mediation process 
A substantial amount of work needs to be done in the pre-negotiation or preparation phase to 
ensure that the mediation has a good chance of being successful. All the parties who are likely to 
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be affected by a decision should be contacted and possibly brought together by the mediator. They 
would expect to have the concept of mediation explained to them and to be encouraged to consider 
whether mediation was the best option in the circumstances. At this stage the mediator would carry 
out a conflict assessment to ensure that the dispute is amenable to mediation. 
If the parties choose to mediate, they select a representative/s or negotiator/s to seek agreement on 
setting an agenda, procedural guidelines, voting procedures, venue/protocols for meetings, and on 
an approach to conflict management. They may decide on the kind of outcome they hope for, that 
is, to reach agreement, to make a recommendation to some decision-making body, or simply to 
clarify issues. At this stage they may come to an agreement on if and how they might reassemble 
if the mediation breaks down at any stage. 
The parties must ensure the mediator has a good understanding of the issues that are in dispute, and 
of the interests and concerns of each party (relayed in confidence to the mediator). The parties 
must then agree on the scope of the issues they intend to address. This agreement provides the 
framework for the fact-finding stage and the kind of information that will form the basis of the 
mediation. One of the biggest challenges to the process is being clear on what information needs 
to be collected, and the form it is presented in. Decisions will be made on whether independent 
consultants or advisors might be needed, where there are information gaps, and how the bringing 
of information to the mediation will be paid for. 
The negotiation or action phase then begins. A skilled mediator may try to encourage the parties 
away from the fixed positions they may have held at the outset, and to be creative about a range of 
options that could reflect their fundamental interests instead. As the mediator is aware of the 
concerns and interests of each of the parties he/she is in a position to contribute options too. The 
mediator is likely to meet privately with each group to test possible trade-offs they are willing to 
make. The mediator can then suggest a possible option without revealing how it was reached. 
The group gradually works towards a draft agreement that is satisfactory to all parties. The mediator 
assists in the preparation of a single text for representatives to take back to their constituents to 
discuss. When final agreement is reached by all the parties, the negotiation phase is complete. 
The major tasks required in the implementation/post-negotiation phase is to link the informal 
agreement that has been reached with formal decision-making processes. The mediator may 
approach elected or appointed officials of regional or territorial councils, or apply to the Planning 
Tribunal for a consent order on behalf of the parties. The mediator may oversee implementation 
of the agreement or convene a monitoring group of the parties involved in the mediation. If 
disagreements emerge at this stage, the mediator may encourage the parties to reassemble, and helps 
remind them of their earlier intentions. 
A tabular version of this process can be seen in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.2 lists factors that may increase or decrease the likelihood of success in reaching agreements 
(see Bingham, 1986, pp.94-120; Amy, 1990, p.223; Cormick in Amy, 1983, p.358; Blackford,I990, 
pp.23-29). 
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Table 3.1 Steps in a mediation process. 
Phase One Prenegotiation 
Getting started 
The potential parties (those who believe their interests are likely to be affected by any decisions made) need to be 
identified and contacted by the mediator. 
Agreement has to be reached amongst the parties to consider mediation to help resolve the conflict. 
The consensus-building process has to be described to parties. 
An initial meeting has to be held and other logistics discussed. 
Representation 
Parties need to choose a spokesperson(s) or team leaders. 
Initial parties help to identify missing groups. 
Strategies have to be devised for representing different interests if there is a large number of parties involved. 
Dll'aftlng protocols, agenda setting !ill€! selecting a mediation strategy 
Draft protocols have to be prepared based on past el!perience and the concerns of the parties. Ground rules and 
behaviourial guidelines need to be established. 
An agenda-setting process has to be determined. 
The mediator helps parties to assess approaches to conflict management and resolution and then to choose an approach. 
Denning issues 
Issues of concern to the parties have to be identified. Agreement needs to be gained on the scope of the issues. This 
provides a framework for the fact findinglinformation gathering stage. 
Joint fact finding 
Fact findinglinformation gathering protocols have to be established. 
Technical consultants, advisors etc. need to be identified. Relevant data about the substance of a conflict are collected 
and analyzed. Accuracy of data must be verified. 
Funds have to be raised and administered in a resource pool. 
The mediator can act as a repository for confidential or propriety information. 
Phase Two Negotiation 
Inventing options 
The parties propose a range of potential options, with the mediator contributing options too. A lowering of 
commitment to fIXed positions or a single alternative is encouraged. 
Subcommittees are set up to draft options. 
Packaging 
The mediator meets privately with each group to identify and test possible trades, and then suggests a potential 
agreement package for the group to consider. 
Written agreement 
The mediator works with a subcommittee to produce a draft agreement. 
The mediator assists in producing a procedure to create a single text. 
A preliminary draft of a single text is prepared. 
Binding the parties 
The mediator holds the bond, and approaches outsiders if necessary on behalf of the group. 
The mediator helps to invent new ways to bind the parties to their commitments. 
Ratification 
The parties are helped by the mediator to 'sell' the agreement to their constituents. 
The mediator ensures that all representatives have been in touch with their constituents. 
Final bargaIning 
Reaching agreement occurs either through a gradual convergence of positions, final leaps to package settlements, 
development of a consensual formula, or establishment of a procedure to reach a substantive agreement. 
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Phase Three Implementation or post-negotiation 
Linking informal agreements and formal decision making 
The mediator works with the parties to invent linkages. 
The mediator approaches elected or appointed officials on behalf of the group. 
The mediator identifies the legal constraints on implementation. 
Monitoring and evaluation 
The mediator selVes as the monitor of implementation and convenes a monitoring group. 
An evaluation procedure is established. 
Renegotiation 
The mediator reassembles the participants if subsequent disagreements emerge, and helps to remind the group of its 
earlier intentions. 
(compiled from models by Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) and Moore (1986)) 
The mediation process that has been outlined will be used as a framework to identify the issues 
arising out of mediations that have already been carried out in this country (Chapter Four). 
Table 3.2 Critical success factors in reaching agreement. 
Participation 
opportunity must be made for all parties likely to be affected by any decisions made to participate. 
parties excluded have the potential to undermine the final agreement. 
mediators may inhibit access by opting to keep the number of participants as small as possible so that 
agreement may be reached more easily. Less powerful groups tend to be the ones that are left out. 
Number and types of parties 
does not appear to affect reaching of agreement although some experts suggest that 15 parties is an ideal 
maximum. 
Direct involvement of decision makers 
major factor in increasing the likelihood of success in reaching agreement and implementing that agreement, 
especially in policy disputes. 
Agreement on procedural issues 
can help the whole process go smoothly. 
demonstrates to the parties that they can negotiate with each other before they get to the fundamental arena 
of conflict. 
can ensure that cultural needs can be built into the process from the outset. 
Sufficient incentives to consider mediation 
if they believe they can achieve more of what they want in another way they are unlikely to participate. 
mutual gains from working co-operatively with another/other parties. 
incentives are not easy to measure. The parties" .... inevitably face different stakes; different probabilities 
of achieving their goals using different strategies; different costs in time, money, and reputation associated 
with these strategies; and different risks associated with winning, losing, or compromising" (Bingham, 1986, 
p.109). 
threat of legal action with the potential expense and delay associated with a Planning Tribunal hearing may 
'encourage' parties to consider negotiation or mediation. 
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Ability to satisfy each party's underlying interests 
can be achieved by focusing on the interests of the parties rather than on their publicly-declared positions. 
mediator looks for interests that may be compatible, or to see whether the parties' interests are sufficiently 
different so as not to be mutually exclusive. 
Disputes in litigation 
when a lawsuit has been filed disputes are generally resolved less frequently than those which had not been 
taken to court. However, over 90% of all environmental lawsuits are settled before the case goes to trial. 
can clarify or focus the issues, as well as raising the stakes sufficiently to encourage reluctant parties to 
mediation. 
'Good faith' mediation 
more likely to occur if the parties involved have some relative ability to exercise sanctions over one another. 
parties have been known to use mediation as a 'fIShing expedition' to get access to scientific and technical data 
and then use it at a subsequent court hearing (Ministry for the Environment, 1988, p.31). 
a party may participate cynically hoping agreement will not be reached. 
Natm-e oi'the issues 
does not appear to affect the likelihood of agreement being reached, in site-specific disputes at least. 
may be linked to factors such as whether the particular dispute has the potential to set precedents, and the 
implications of that (Bingham, 1986, pp.117-118). 
Agreement on the scope of the issues 
probably increases the chance of success. If parties cannot agree on the problem, and its scope, then they will 
face difficulty in finding solutions they can all agree with. 
critical factor in cross-cultural environmental disputes. One party may argue that the problem is technical 
while another may claim it is a violation of a cultural or spiritual belief. 
Gaining agreement on the facts 
can be very complicated in environmental disputes. 
parties inevitably disagree about the effects of proposed developments or policies on the environment, 
particularly with regard to issues over risk and uncertainty. 
there may be no agreement over the accuracy, relevance or completeness of the facts presented nor over how 
the data should be weighted. 
difficulties inevitably arise in cross-cultural negotiations where problems and solutions emerge from totally 
different cultural perspectives. 
parties are often unequally resourced when it comes to collecting the data and performing the analysis they 
need to negotiate effectively (see below). If this problem is not overcome, the chances of success is limited. 
One solution is to encourage parties to pool resources to carry out a joint fact-finding effort (Bingham, 1986, 
p.l20). 
Availability of funds Cor implementation 
negotiations of Indian water rights in the United States are proceeding without a clear indication of whether 
there is sufficient Federal funding to implement them (McCool, 1991, pp.12-23). Talbot (1983) and Amy 
(1983) describe a case involving the Lummi Indian tribe where a lack of tribal funds to fulfil particular aspects 
of the agreement has thwarted implementation. 
Adapted from Bingham, 1986, pp.91-120. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Environmental mediation in New Zealand: three case studies 
4.1 Background 
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine mediation practice to date in New Zealand in the natural 
resource area in order to identify issues surrounding Maori participation. The mediation process 
outlined in Chapter Three will be used as a framework for this examination. The process has not 
been presented as a baseline for environmental mediation or as an ideal, but rather as a formal 'text-
book' description. Other approaches could and should be examined as part of the development of 
our own indigenous environmental mediation practice. 
There are probably few cases of mediation that conform completely with the approach. Although 
the three case studies have been referred to as mediation, purists might argue that they were hybrid 
processes involving elements of facilitation, negotiation, mediation, and in some instances, 
arbitration at different stages in their decision-making processes. 
The disputes are examples of where Maori cultural and spiritual values have been explicitly 
addressed. The particular cases were also chosen because they reflect three levels of conflict, that 
is, resource ownerShip, resource policy, and resource management. 
The first is a land/resource ownership claim filed with the Waitangi Tribunal in 1987 by the 
Ruapuha hapu (Ngati Maniopoto) for land surrounding and including parts of the Waitomo Caves. 
Around the same time the Labour Government was preparing the Tourist Hotel Corporation (THC) 
chain (which included the Waitomo Hotel) for sale. However, the Court of Appeal decision in New 
Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General in 1987 provided for protection for the recovery of land 
subject to some claims lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal. Provisions under s.9A of the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975 allowed the claim to go to mediation. A member of the Waitangi Tribunal was 
appointed to mediate. 
The second case involved the application of the then Labour Government's indigenous forest policy 
to the indigenous forests of South Westland south of the Cook River. Crown-'owned' forests were 
to be allocated to the new Forestry Corporation for wood production or to the Department of 
Conservation for reservation. In 1986 the Secretary for the Environment was directed to consult 
with all affected groups and a Working Party was established. A representative of Te Koiti Turanga, 
a Tai Poutini Kai Tahu hapu, participated in the Working Party. A second hapu, Katiwaewae, 
claimed they should have been involved too. 
The third case is a site-specific conflict in which the Te Atiawa people have been trying to protect 
their shellfish beds from local pollution. Until the early 1970s semi-raw freezing works effluent and 
Borough wastes were being discharged into the Waitara River. The pollution of kawa was affecting 
their supply and therefore tribal mana. An outfall was installed to discharge wastes out to sea but 
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problems arose over the installation. In the early 1980s two 'Think Big' petrochemical plants needed 
water rights to dispose of their wastes. The Planning Tribunal granted the N.Z Synthetic Fuels 
Corp Ltd the right to discharge through a new outfall that was to be built at Motonui (over the 
Ngati Rahiri reefs). This finding was challenged by the Waitangi Tribunal in 1983. A Task Force 
set up subsequent to the Tribunal finding recommended that the new outfall be built, and that users 
undertake their own land-based treatment. An alternative proposal was investigated by the North 
Taranaki District Council in the meantime based on upgrading the existing outfall in conjunction 
with land-based hi-lime treatment. This proposal was subsequently accepted by the Government 
(who were to subsidise part of the project). 
(The original intention in this third case was to focus on a mediation process designed to seek and 
gain statutory consents for the new outfall as part of the Waitara Wastewater Scheme as it became 
known. However, it was incongruous from the point of view of the parties involved to examine what 
was just one part of a much larger and very complex process that has taken place over 20 years, and 
is continuing to evolve. For this reason we have looked at the wider decision process to identify 
issues that are relevant to the mediation of cross-cultural issues. The decision process involved 
adjudication, negotiation, facilitation and mediation at different stages over those 20 years, as well 
as a number of facilitators and mediators.) 
A fuller background to these cases can be found in Appendix 7. 
All of the Maori and many of the non-Maori participants in these cases and the mediator in one 
were personally interviewed. Two participants and one mediator responded by mail. The questions 
in Appendix 8 were used as a starting point for discussion with the participants who were free to 
raise whatever issues were relevant to them. In many cases the issues that are presented relate to 
Maori involvement in the mediations; they were raised by both Maori and non-Maori participants. 
However, some issues that were raised by non-Maori participants that apply to anyone participating 
in mediation are also discussed. The perspectives presented are not necessarily that of objective 
reality but rather of the participants' perceptions of the issues. 
Initially the intention was to describe each of the three processes and then to extract issues from 
each case. After carrying out a number of interviews it became apparent that people could be 
correctly or incorrectly identified very easily if findings were reported on a case-by-case basis because 
respondents belonged to or were associated with small communities. For this reason we have drawn 
out the key issues raised in each case and have presented only the combined findings on the basis 
of respondents' perceptions. 
4.2 Process issues arising out of the case studies 
4.2.1 Pre-negotiation phase 
Participation 
An awareness has been slowly growing amongst Crown agencies and others with delegated 
responsibility that tangata whenua must be consulted and involved in resource management decision 
making (see Chapter Two). 
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However, it can be difficult for the mediator to know who he/she is talking to, or should be talking 
to, with regard to Maori participation. A fundamental issue in cross-cultural mediation is identifying 
who has the mana to be a party to the mediation. A second issue is that if land claims have not 
been resolved, two or several iwi, hapu or whanau may challenge the right to be involved in a 
mediation. Related to this is the question of who ought to decide who or which Maori interests 
should participate. The fourth issue is the mistaken perception that one Maori individual is 
sufficient to represent inter-iwi and intra-iwi complexity and diversity. Maori groups may attempt 
to resolve questions of participation and representation in public when they are unhappy with 
existing processes. 
Political processes can also have adverse effects on mediations. Such processes can cause delays, 
force attention away from fundamental issues, thwart the possibility of reaching final agreement, or 
disadvantage some of the parties. 
Explaining the mediation process to participants 
When parties publicly declare positions from which they do not intend to budge, there can be no 
room for compromise or eventual agreement. Mediation is not a viable alternative in these 
situations. The mediator has to help the other parties to decide how to deal with this situation. 
The mediator did not always explain both the advantages and the disadvantages of mediation 
(particularly with regard to outcome), the potential character of the process, that mediation assumes 
'consensus decision making, nor his role in the process. Sometimes the mediator did not hold 
preliminary meetings with all the parties and therefore did not gain an understanding of the issues 
from the perspective of each party. This created mistrust amongst the parties and undermined the 
neutrality of the mediator. 
Other issues that arose were: a lack of awareness that participants could challenge aspects of the 
process that they were not happy with or that they could change it if they all agreed; a mediator 
explaining a process but then not follOwing it through; some parties wished to meet directly with 
other parties from time to time without going through the mediator; and a lack of awareness that 
mediation can involve both face-to-face gatherings as well as meetings of individual groups with the 
mediator. A number of parties expressed concern at this last issue, particularly when they were 
aware of meetings being held to which they were not invited. 
One of the problems for iwi is that they are only able to get advice on mediation from the Justice 
Department, or the mediator himlherself rather than gaining what they believe to be independent 
advice from sources outside the Crown-controlled system. 
Representation 
The fundamental issue here is who has status within the iwi, hapu or whanau to act as 
representative. Several groups may emerge. There are those with manawhenua through the 
principle of ahi kaa. There are others with manawhenua who have moved away from their tribal 
area and live elsewhere. A third group (now referred to as taurahere) is those who have moved 
from their tribal area but claim to have an interest, as Maori, in the area where they now live. 
28 
Maori participants are not always given enough time to choose their representative/so When time 
is too short to choose a representative in the appropriate way, it can have repercussions further on 
in the process. Splinter groups may emerge, claiming that their interests were not properly 
represented. 
The credibility of a representative is very precious to the process. Credible representatives have the 
support of their elders, and anyone who tries to enter the dispute later needs to have very strong 
credentials to confront or oppose what is happening. 
One problem for iwi is that non-Maori processes may 'allow' only one official representative for each 
group that participates. It is too much for one Maori person to have to cope with all the issues of 
secrecy etc. There are difficulties for Maori groups who have been brought up in different ways, and 
there is a lot of confusion about the right way to do things. Difficulties arose when representatives 
were not permitted to have advisors or others with them. 
A lack of communication that sometimes occurs between representatives and their constituents in 
a mediation means that not everybody is informed of what is happening. Problems arise when 
different groups have different attitudes towards where compromise could or should be made or even 
whether it should be made at all. When members of the iwi or hapu live in different places it is also 
very difficult to inform them of the progress being made. A further problem that arose was when 
one hapu that was not represented did not receive feedback. 
Sometimes insufficient time was given to both Maori and other representatives to consult with their 
iwi, hapu or constituents. Representatives can be placed in a difficult position when they are pressed 
for an immediate response to a particular issue and not given the opportunity to go back to their 
people to discuss it with them. 
Constituents forget from time to time that some sort of compromise generally needs to be made by 
all the parties. Consensus decision making is a characteristic of the process, and parties may not 
achieve all their Objectives. Representatives need to remind their people of this. 
Problems arise for Maori representatives when they are required to be loyal to a Pakeha process 
instead of their people. The mediator may impress on the representatives the need for secrecy 
during the negotiations. The representatives may then be criticised by their people for not sharing 
information. 
The final issue here relates to legal representation. Difficulties can arise when lawyers are acting 
on a party's behalf but may not fully understand all the concerns of the wider iwi, hapu or whanau 
group. 
Procedures for the mediation and preparing an agenda 
Little attention appears to have been given in any of the cases to dealing with the protocols 
suggested in Section 3.4, apart from an agreement as to how to deal with the media. 
Various issues arose with regard to venue, costs of participation, and voting procedures. These 
should be dealt with in the early stages of the mediation to avoid some of the problems, and to 
ensure that there is a greater chance of agreement being reached at the end of the process. 
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When a hui is held on a marae and a Maori representative is 'in charge', it is seen by Maori people 
to provide some opportunity to redress the power imbalance that may exist. Maori people value the 
chance to present their views to the mediator on the marae. When meetings are not held on a 
marae this may not be an issue if opportunities are available for cultural perspectives to be 
expressed. 
Non-Maori may show signs of discomfort on the marae, particularly when they are unfamiliar with 
the way discussions are carried out. They may expect to stop for morning/afternoon tea at set times, 
and then prepare to leave as 5 o'clock approaches. Maori, on the other hand, tend to wait for 
natural breaks in the discussion or carry on until the issue has been resolved. It seemed that non-
Maori were suspicious of what appeared to be Maori tactics to avoid letting things be settled. 
Non-Maori may also become frustrated because 'too much' time is needed to reach decisions that 
supposedly could be met more quickly in a more formal meeting setting. There is the need for a 
powhiri, introductory speeches and time to 'clear dirty water' before getting on to the issues. 
Some non-Maori people find it difficult to make progress on the marae. Some claim that no 
compromise is possible because all try to retain their mana. They prefer to speak to a liaison group 
away from the marae, and then let this group take back the information to their people. In the view 
of some non-Maori, decisions need to be made by representatives rather than the whole group. 
Other comments made by non-Maori representatives with regard to the marae were that: the marae 
is necessary for everybody to be able to air their views rather than as a decision-making forum; 
there is a tension between using a basic discussion forum and imposing what is a non-Maori legal 
or quasi-legal system on that forum; it is deflating if only Maori views are heard on the marae; 
people do not have to sit on a marae to resolve environmental disputes, they simply need to 
understand the real meaning of Maoritanga; and when meetings are held on the marae there tends 
to be no records kept on paper (compared with Crown agencies which keep thorough recordS). 
For others, the marae venue can provide an opportunity for personal growth. The relative 
informality of the marae may be preferred to the formal court room situation where the Judge holds 
the power. Everybody is free to say what they wish. Non-Maori can inadvertently behave in an 
inappropriate and even insulting way on the marae. Concern was expressed that Maori culture may 
be compromised when a non-Maori man is permitted to speak on the marae during whaikorero and 
yet a Maori woman would not be. 
The attitudes of non-Maori people can change in their own venues. They may become 
condescending, patronising, and insincere to Maori. Communication can be mostly one-way and not 
everybody is given the opportunity to speak. 
Maori protocols are not always practised. 
The issue of whether meetings should be open or closed also arose. Closed meetings provide no 
accountability to the general public. 
It is important that meetings are held in the actual area of the resources in dispute. 
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The costs of participating were unequal in all cases. Many of the non-Maori representatives were 
paid employees of organisations, with organisational or departmental backup. On the other hand, 
most Maori representatives had to meet their expenses themselves. Those who were self-employed 
had to bear a loss of income while they were attending meetings; others took time off work without 
pay to assist in their campaign. Sometimes the community was able to help Maori representatives 
financially; at other times it was not. 
Funds are available under s.15[1](ha) of the Legal Aid Act 1969 for Maori proceedings that are 
before the Waitangi Tribunal. (The Waitangi Tribunal has the power to commission research or 
to authorise a claimant to commission research at the expense of the Tribunal.) Those representing 
Crown agencies have their expenses funded by their organisations. 
There is concern that people who are not monied have to plead for financial help, especially for 
research. Resources are generally not available for Maori representatives to provide more 
information on their position. On the other hand, there appeared to be no limits on the amount of 
money spent producing scientific and. technical information. In one case it was suggested that 
between $5 and $6 million was spent. In another it appeared that more money was being spent on 
investigations (in terms of millions of dollars) than on what would be spent on implementing the 
final outcome. Sometimes the cost of mediating what was inevitably happening in that particular 
area was disproportionate to the actual change that would occur. 
Voting procedures arose as a major problem for some; this resulted in the inability to reach final 
agreement. The debate was over agreement being reached by majority rule or by a unanimous 
decision. This issue is contrary to the character of mediation. 
Defining tire issues 
Problems arise when too much information is generated. There can be too much information on 
a wide range of issues, but not enough on the area where real change can occur. Sometimes there 
appeared to be no attempt to isolate what information was needed. 
When issues are not well-defined false expectations can be raised. This problem is exacerbated when 
the mediator's brief may prevent the objectives of some of the parties from being included but allows 
the objectives of an agency external to the mediation to be included. If the mediator's brief is not 
made expressly clear at the beginning, parties may want to address a wide range of issues that are 
important to them. There can be a huge responsibility on the part of the mediator in terms of 
expectations that may be set up. People can put huge amounts of time and energy into the process 
to have their say. 
Sometimes the mediator may lack an understanding of the context and underlying concerns. The 
mediator needs to ensure that the mediation is historically connected; the process must respond to 
its historical context and the outcome must be integrated into the future. 
Crown institutions often separate resource issues in a way that is incompatible with Maori views of 
the natural world. Institutional arrangements separate the water from the fish, for example, whereas 
to the Maori they are a single entity. 
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Tangata whenua issues may be pushed aside by issues that are more compelling for the non-Maori 
participants. 
Joint fact jimling 
Access to information was not equal in any of the cases, although views differed over this issue. 
Sometimes a Crown agency would control the information flow, or even give privileged access to one 
of the parties only. 
The lack of mediator guidance through the process of information gathering could mean that the 
information gathered is meaningless as far as Maori perspectives are concerned. Technical solutions 
may be offered to address cultural problems. 
When Maori parties have to make a decision quickly as to whether they will participate, they may 
not be given enough time to get themselves organised. On the other hand, other parties may have 
tremendous resources available to them to prepare their case. 
4.2.2 Negotiation phase 
Information exchange 
Pakeha attitudes towards Maori parties and the information they presented varied from very 
considerate to paternalistic to scornful and uninterested. Some Maori people became very tired of 
being talked down to by technical people and academics who threw technical language at them. 
Processes varied, particularly over time, in their ability to allow an eXChange of cultural perspectives. 
Sometimes Maori representatives were able to bring practical experience to the mediation to balance 
the scientific/academic point of view. At other times there was an inability of parties on both sides 
to understand technical and engineering concepts and Maori cultural values. Some engineers and 
academics acted as if their expertise was being challenged. Instead, it was their perspective of the 
problem that was being challenged. They did not understand that the issue was rather that of trying 
to explain the Maori perspective. 
Voluminous quantities of technical information emerged at times, reducing the opportunity of 
keeping things simple. Those parties with an engineering perspective believed that if they could 
come up with a perfect technical solution everything else would fall into place. However, these 
people had no ability to communicate with the Maori community. They were attempting to present 
a technical solution that could not address a cultural perception they did not understand. 
Information sharing involves the reinterpretation of issues, and the restatement and simplification 
of complex scientific concepts. Non-Maori parties may have to accept and respect Maori spiritual 
beliefs that they cannot understand, and to recognise the need to find alternatives that are 
compatible with those beliefs. 
Maori representatives believe that they can negotiate effectively when they have knowledge and 
experience of the resource being discussed and of the local area. This provides a balance to the 
scientific/academic point of view. When representatives are not aware of the broader issues or 
underlying pOlitical agendas, they can be at a disadvantage. 
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Non-Maori representatives may prefer to learn from Maori representatives outside formal meeting 
settings. 
Inventing options 
If the process is rushed, time can become the critical factor in how the issues are handled. 
Resentment is felt by the parties if important decisions are made at 3 a.m. or if 15 minutes are spent 
on making a decision on what has been identified as a key issue at the outset. Long meetings are 
very unsatisfactory. 
Resentment is also felt when the mediator actually sets up the options whilst the group is only 
allowed to choose an option rather than establishing the range of options themselves. 
The uncertainty of the law-making process can cause difficulties when parties are considering 
options. It must not be presumed that the provisions in a Bill will be carried forward into an Act. 
Problems can arise when parties attempt to get legal opinion on such matters. The mediator can 
be in the position of appearing to accept the opinion of only one of the parties' legal counsel when 
advice is conflicting. Some decisions may have to be deferred until Bills are enacted, or alternative 
scenarios are considered depending on the outcome of the legislative process. 
Agreement 
When the mediator designs a possible outcome that has not been negotiated amongst the parties 
the agreement can subsequently break down, or not even be reached. 
Implementation 
Bitterness is felt by parties when some of the recommendations that come out of mediations are not 
implemented. This is particularly so when the issues that were of concern to the mediator are all 
actioned. Parties are also bitter when changes and amendments are made to the final outcome, but 
the parties to the mediation are not called back together. Parties resent deviations from the intent 
of the mediation and the agreements. 
Although the outcome was agreed to by all affected parties in another case, the agreement broke 
down within the first few months of the mediator leaving. Presumably the mediator should have 
spoken to groups after agreement was reached to learn of some potential problems. 
4.3 The mediator 
4.3.1 Appointment/selection 
The process can become distorted if the parties are unclear as to why the mediator has been called 
in. If the parties do not know who the mediator is for some time, they do not have the opportunity 
to question the choice if they wish. 
Parties resent having a mediator imposed on them if they have no choice over his/her selection. 
Parties like to believe they can reject the mediator if they are unhappy with the choice. 
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Some believe that a central government public servant who is appointed to mediate is not neutral. 
An agent of the Government is not a disinterested party. 
4.3.2 Role of the mediator 
If the mediator is seen to be trying to promote particular solutions, to push political agendas, to 
work towards a predetermined outcome and/or appears to represent a vested interest, he/she is not 
seen to be neutral. The mediator's function in this instance moves close to advocacy. 
If mediators have either nominated themselves or were picked by one party they may be seen to have 
a bias. If they seem to be on the side of the bureaucrats or come from a professional background 
with a particular world view, they will not be seen to be neutral. 
A mediator can act as facilitator between members of one of the parties if there is disagreement. 
A ground rule of the process is having the mediator act as a repository for confidential information. 
When the mediator is trusted this win be possible. The mediator needs to make it clear that he/she 
is not the decision maker. He/she also needs to clarify the extent to which he/she can assist in the 
implementation of the final agreement. 
If the mediator is always short of time it can cause problems for the parties. Time is needed to 
monitor the process and this assumes an on-going involvement. 
4.3.3 Skills and qualities of the mediator 
The mediator did not always have sufficient knowledge of Maori structures and tikanga. One 
mediator arranged for a kaumatua to advise on what was happening during hui at the marae. 
Parties feel disappointed if the mediator has no knowledge of the local community and how it differs 
from other communities. A long-term perspective on the community in question is needed. They 
are also concerned if the mediator has difficulty understanding Maori concerns because they are not 
expressed in scientific or technical language. 
Parties had varying views as to whether the mediator was skilled at managing meetings by consensus. 
However, they do respect a mediator who has facilitation skills. Such a mediator allows everyone 
the opportunity to express their own views and to hear others' views. The process is kept open and 
flexible. The mediator does not overrule the parties nor does he or she put themselves above the 
parties. 
When a mediator is respected Maori parties may temporarily transgress an aspect of their kawa to 
demonstrate that respect. 
Representatives feel very uncomfortable if the mediator singles them out or he/she does not always 
respect the opinion of some of the parties. 
A mediator needs commitment and respect. He or she must be open-minded and sincere. 
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4.4 Summary 
On the positive side, Maori parties were mostly given ample opportunities to express their views. 
Those who had negotiating experience or knowledge of the facts and the issues felt empowered. In 
one case a party was sufficiently aware of a good alternative to mediation, and of some of the costs 
and benefits of taking that course of action. A good relationship developed in one case but 
diminished in another. 
However, the notion of a 'playing field that is not level' when it comes to Maori participation was 
very apparent. The power imbalances that exist in the broader societal context reappear in dispute 
resolution processes such as mediation. Diversity is recognised in non-Maori concerns but inter-
and intra-iwi diversity is not automatically recognised. There is a mistaken perception amongst non-
Maori that one Maori person can represent all Maori views. 
While Maori groups appeared to understand their own interests, aspects of the process such as 
participation and representation issues, choice of mediator, the effects of wider political processes, 
lack of time for hapu/whanau accountability processes etc. often prevented them from advocating 
those interests. There appeared to be few opportunities for parties to determine their own process. 
Mostly the process was 'owned' by the mediator rather than by the parties themselves or it was 
driven by the agendas of Crown agencies. Participation tended to be reactive rather than proactive. 
Access to information was not equal for all parties. Western scientific values may prevail or appear 
to prevail over Maori cultural and spiritual values. The imbalance in resources between and 
amongst parties that occurs with other models (adjudication, negotiation) still exists with mediation. 
Enormous sums of money appeared to be available to bring scientific and technical information to 
the mediations. Apart from the potential for some funding for legal aid and for· research associated 
with Waitangi Tribunal claims, Maori participants in the case studies had few resources to 
participate or to bring iwi cultural/spiritual information to the negotiating table. The mediator was 
usually self-selected, or selection provided no choice because it was part of an institutional structure. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Preparing a dispute resolution strategy 
S.l Introduction 
The issues that emerged from the case studies demonstrate that, from a Maori perspective, there are 
major shortcomings in mediation practice to date. The hypothetical 'playing field' is not level. 
Processes were driven by Crown agencies and this did not assist Maori groups to advocate their own 
interests in the way they wished, or to empower them. Participation was reactive rather than 
proactive. Cultural integrity was rarely maintained in the desired manner. Access to information 
was not equal nor was the availability of resources for participation. Mediation has a limited 
attractiveness for Maori people if it continues to develop in this way. 
1wi need to stand back and ask whether mediation is able to meet their needs and help them achieve 
a desired outcome. Two questions must be asked: 
1. what are the dispute resolution options available to them when a dispute arises, and what factors 
should they consider when making that choice, and 
2. if mediation appears to be the preferred option, how can Maori participation be effective? 
This chapter develops an approach to choosing a dispute resolution option through the preparation 
of a dispute resolution strategy (DRS). The following chapter deals with providing for effective 
Maori participation in mediation by means of an environmental mediation strategy (EMS). 
S.2 What is a dispute resolution strategy? 
A dispute resolution strategy (DRS) is a strategy devised by any group or individual in which they 
define for themselves a process to follow when seeking resolution of any dispute. 
A DRS should: 
1. state what the group wants to achieve (Le. desired outcome or objective) 
2. identify opportunities and constraints to achieving this outcome 
3. define a 'bottom line' or best alternative to the desired outcome 
4. evaluate the various dispute resolution options that are available, appropriate and 'affordable' 
5. define a process for implementing and reviewing the agreed strategy. 
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5.3 Why prepare a dispute resolution strategy? 
1. To focus on an agreed Maori objective 
A DRS requires that the group focuses on the pursuit of an identified, agreed Maori outcome. 
Many disputes are compounded because there is not necessarily common agreement within the 
group as to what the desired objective or preferred outcome is. This can often result in the 
group's objectives being undermined even by those within the group because of misunderstanding 
or confusion over what the main objective is. 
2. To encourage a proactive stance 
A DRS encourages and enables the Maori individual or group to be proactive rather than 
reactive to initiatives or processes devised by others. The group itself decides which resolution 
options are appropriate for it within the context of the dispute and the kinds of resources it has 
or does not have. The group itself determines whether to use or not use a particular approacWes 
to resolving a dispute, and at what point it either 'enters' or 'leaves' a particular resolution 
process. 
3. To empower the group 
It is empowering for a group to determine for itself what is appropriate, 'realistic' or 'affordable', 
to define its own strategy and to determine the rightness or wrongness of doing or not doing 
certain things. While critics could say that it is only an illusion of power, and that the 'real' 
power lies elsewhere i.e. with decision makers, legislators, those with money and so on, there is 
nevertheless power in being organised, having a unity of objective, purpose and vision, devising 
your own strategy, and deciding what is appropriate and 'right' for you. 
4. To evaluate consistency with other environmental objectives 
Groups may have other environmental goals or objectives that they are pursuing in respect of 
the natural and physical environment. Preparing a DRS provides the opportunity to assess 
whether the objective for the dispute at hand is consistent with or in conflict with these other 
environmental objectives. If there is conflict the group can take the opportunity to either 
remove this inconsistency or at least explain or justify such inconsistencies to itself. 
5. To evaluate consistency with other socia~ cultural and economic objectives 
The group may also be pursuing numerous other economic, social, and cultural objectives, which 
may either directly or indirectly relate to the dispute at hand. Preparing a DRS provides the 
opportunity to balance any of these other objectives with the defined objective in the dispute, 
to assess the extent to which the desired outcome supports, is in conflict with or could potentially 
undermine these other objectives. It also encourages the group to undertake an holistic appraisal 
of other group aspirations to ensure consistency with these aspirations. 
6. To consider potential alliances that could help to achieve group aspirations 
7. To consider costs and access 
To be aware of the costs of participation, providing information etc., the kind of time period 
required to resolve the dispute, and ease of access into a dispute resolution process. 
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5.4 How to prepare a dispute resolution strategy 
Preparation of a DRS may follow a basic procedure outlined below, but be amended to suit any 
group or individual needs. 
Phase 1 
Define a desired Maori outcome or objective 
A DRS must clearly state the desired Maori outcome or objective to be achieved from the particular 
dispute. Because there may be differences within the 'group' (i.e. iwi, hapu, whanau, Marae 
Committee, Runanga) as to what exactly is desired, sufficient time needs to be taken to allow 
discussion within the group to seek either agreement or a common understanding of this desired 
outcome. For example, a development proposal by a construction company that may result in the 
desecration of a waahi tapu site may produce a series of desired Maori outcomes ranging from 
seeking transfer of title for the land to the group to ensuring that certain conditions are placed on 
the development to protect the waahi tapu. 
The desired Maori outcome needs to be clearly stated so that all within the group are in no doubt 
as to what this desired outcome is, and can work towards this outcome with a unity of purpose and 
organisation. 
Phase 2 
Devise a 'checklist' of all relevant internal and external factors that will have an impact on the dispute, 
and that may assist in or detract from achieving the desired outcome 
The aim of this phase is threefold: firstly, to gather an approximate idea of the extent to which the 
desired outcome is achievable or not achievable, having considered aU internal and external 
constraints and opportunities. Secondly, to enable the group to define its bottom line. Thirdly, to 
then provide a basis for choosing the most appropriate dispute resolution options. 
1. N ga Tikanga 
a. Mana 
Determining the effects of using any particular dispute resolution option on its mana is a task 
for the group, whether iwi, hapu or whanau, taking into account its history, experiences, current 
predicament and future aspirations. Many questions need to be addressed by the group. What 
is to be gained or lost by entering or not entering a particular process? To what extent (if any) 
is its mana diminished or enhanced by doing or not doing certain things? What impact win 
involvement have in either diminishing or affirming its mana? Are compromise gains (or 
alternatives) as a result of any particular resolution process acceptable and what form should this 
take so as to leave the group's mana intact? 
b. Cultural integrity 
The group must find the balance for itself of what can be foregone, 'given away', or 
'compromised' in the pursuit of perhaps a 'higher goal', more fundamental aspiration, other 
priority, or more pressing immediate obligation. A practical example could be a question posed 
to the group: What would our great, great grandchildren think of us in 60 years time if we took 
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this particular approach to resolving this problem? Are we sacrificing or affecting any of our 
cultural or spiritual values? If so, to what extent? Is it justified? What is the justification? 
Many Maori carry out this justification process instinctively. 
c. Values 
The group will have its own set of cultural, spiritual, social and even economic values. It will 
also have its customs, beliefs and lores that it will wish to enhance and protect. How are these 
provided or not provided for in any dispute resolution option? 
d. Experience 
The group will also have its own set of experiences, tribal histories, contemporary realities that 
win affect the way it views anything and that affect its order of priorities. For example, the iwi 
may have been subject to extensive confiscation of its lands by the Crown. History will shape 
the group's sense of injustice which could in turn affect strategies that it has for dealing with any 
related disputes. 
e. Manawhenua 
Does the group have the manawhenua to deal with the particular issue? Will this right be 
challenged by other iwi, hapu or whanau? How should any challenges be dealt with? 
f. Tribal or group policy statements 
Does the group have its own policy or established practise or precedent on the particular issue? 
2. Legal instruments 
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 outline legislation and legal precedents contained in case law that can 
be used to protect the Maori interest and facilitate pursuit of the desired Maori outcome. 
3. Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 discuss Crown and Waitangi Tribunal principles that have been 
established. These may relate to issues in a particular dispute. Other groups such as tribal 
authorities and environmental groups may have prepared policy statements or objectives that may 
support the Objectives of the group. 
4. POlicy statements and plans 
Is there national policy established by the Crown or any other authoritative body on the 
particular issue? 
Are there any relevant policies contained in a Regional Planning Scheme, Regional Policy 
Statement or Regional Plan, District Planning Scheme or District Plan that can be used to 
support or inhibit pursuit of the desired outcome? 
Have any management plans been prepared for the area, site, or locality identifying policies or 
Objectives which can be used by the group? 
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5. Site-specific issues 
Are there any site-specific issues that the group knows about or can obtain knowledge about to 
support their case? 
Phase 3 
Define the 'bottom line' or the best alternative to the desired Maori outcome 
Having worked through its checklist of relevant factors which may have an impact on the dispute, 
and then evaluated for itself the extent to which its desired outcome is achievable or not achievable, 
the group should then attempt to define a 'bottom line' or best alternative. 
Phose 4 
Identify a range of dispute resolution options that can be used 
The group should identify a range of dispute resolution options which are available, accessible, 
appropriate and 'affordable'. The options should suit the group and particular dispute. It is crucial 
that, wherever possible, one or more of the judicial options, particularly submissions and, if 
necessary, appeals under the Resource Management Act 1991 or other relevant legislation are 
incorporated into the DRS to protect the legal standing of the group. Those options are also a 
necessary precursor to the additional dispute resolution procedures provided by the Resource 
Management Act 1991, and can also provide a legal fall-back position for any other alternative 
dispute resolution options which may be available. 
The Legal Services Bill has been reintroduced to Parliament but it is unlikely that monies will be 
available for Maori, environmental and community groups. This should be investigated. 
Options can be divided into two categories, judicial and non-judicial. 
Judicial options are those which are provided for by legislation or legal procedure, including: 
1. Submissions and appeals under the Resource Management Act 1991 
Submissions to various proposed policy statements and plants, including: National Policy 
Statements (Section 49), Proposed National Coastal, Policy Statements (Section 57), 
Regional Policy Statements (Section 60), Regional Coastal Plans (Section 64), Regional 
Plans (Section 65) and District Plans (Section 73). 
Submissions can also be made to: Resource consent applications (Section 96), 
Requirements (Section 169), Heritage Order, requirements (Section 190) and Water 
Conservation Orders applications (Section 205). 
Appeals can be made to the Planning Tribunal in respect of submissions, to the High 
Court on points of law arising from Planning Tribunal decision (Section 299), and to the 
Court of Appeal in respect of decisions made by the High Court (Section 308). 
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2. Additional dispute resolution provisions under the Resource Management Act 1991, including: 
Mediation, clarification or facilitation of any matter in relation to a resource consent 
application (Section 99); mediation, conciliation or other procedure to facilitate the 
resolution of any matter before or at any time during the course of a Planning Tribunal 
Hearing (Section 268), and Arbitration (Section 356). 
3. Provisions for submission, objection or appeal provided by legislation other than the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (Refer to Chapter 2) 
4. Claim to the Waitangi Tribunal under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1875 ( and subsequent 
amendments). 
Non-judicial options could include direct negotiation with other parties, or voluntary mediation, 
facilitation or arbitration not necessarily pursuant to any legislation. 
Phase 5 
Evaluate the costs and benefits of the various dispute resolution options 
Having worked through a checklist of relevant factors and considered the various dispute resolution 
options, the group then needs to evaluate each resolution option in terms of potential costs and 
benefits to itself. 
Costs could include: financial cost; personnel needs; information requirements; expertise required, 
whether Maori, legal or technical; time constraints; as well as lack of knowledge of different 
resolution processes. 
Benefits could include: already established good relationships with one or more of the other parties 
to the dispute, alliances which can be made or which exist with other groups, ability to lobby support 
from central government and local authority staff and politicians, existing legislation and case law 
which can be utilised, established policy or plans which may support the group's Objectives, as wen 
as the possibility of establishing important Maori legal precedents. 
Phase 6 
Choose the most appropriate dispute resolution options and the sequence for their usage 
Having defined a preferred outcome, devised and worked through relevant factors, assessed the 
various dispute resolution options and weighed up the relative costs and benefits of each, the group 
should then decide dispute resolution options to take, and the sequence for their usage. 
This 'approach' then becomes the Dispute Resolution Strategy or DRS. 
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Phose 7 
Identify a process to implement and then to review the DRS 
The DRS is then implemented and continually reviewed to ensure it pursues the desired Maori 
outcome. Review is also necessary to cope with changing or unexpected circumstances that may 
arise during its implementation. For example, new legislation or policy may be passed that could 
significantly enhance or inhibit pursuit of the objective. Alternatively the group may run out of 
money, time or personnel. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Maori strategy for environmental mediation 
6.1 Scope and purpose 
If a process indigenous to New Zealand is to develop over time there is a need to ensure that all 
parties are able to participate effectively. In this Chapter a Maori environmental mediation strategy 
(EMS) is outlined as a further means of providing for more effective participation of Maori groups 
in environmental mediation. Rather than attempting to prescribe a particular process, we are 
advocating means by which Maori groups can be proactive in negotiating a process with the other 
parties that empowers them sufficiently to advocate their own interests and achieve a desired Maori 
outcome. 
In devising such a strategy we have been guided by the kaupapa outlined in Section 1.2; any process 
guidelines must recognise te tino rangatiratanga 0 te lwi Maori, appropriate pre-negotiation 
procedures and accountability processes that implement tikanga Maori are to be developed, and 
mediation processes must recognise and provide for the complexity and diversity of Maori society. 
The strategy proposed here is intended to be sufficiently broad in character to allow iwi, hapu, 
whanau, or any Maori group to express their rangatiratanga as they see fit. One could expect a 
different response from each of the iwi of this country because the environment is different amongst 
them. Different responses could be expected between rural and urban groups; each have different 
needs and values. In so doing the EMS recognises that acknowledging rangatiratanga is also 
acknowledging the right of iwi to be diverse and not necessarily to be mirror images of each other. 
What may be appropriate for one iwi may not necessarily be appropriate for another. lwi groups 
decide what is appropriate for them. 
6.2 Pre-pre-negotiation phase 
The specific issues that arose in the case studies can be grouped into four main categories -
participation, representation, process, and the mediator. In order to participate effectively Maori 
groups need to do a lot of preparation with regard to these issues in what we have termed a pre-pre-
negotiation stage before they interface with non-Maori parties to the dispute. 
The concepts of tino rangatiratanga, tribal hierarchy, manawhenua, ahi kaa and kaitiakitanga provide 
the basis for Maori participation in environmental mediation. They determine who has the right 
to be involved, the grounds on which that right is claimed, and the nature of that right. 
As discussed already, the concept of tino rangatiratanga implies a state of absolute authority over 
one's resources. Taken from Article Two of Te Tiriti the concept has also been translated to mean 
'absolute chieftainship' or 'highest mana'. Te Tiriti guaranteed the " ... Chiefs, the hapus and all the 
people of New Zealand, the full chieftainship of their lands, their villages and all their possessions". 
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The word "possessions" was translated as '0 ratou taonga katoa' meaning everything which they 
value including lands, villages, possessions, language, spirituality. 
The concept of rangatiratanga therefore is an awesome one, denoting something akin to 'final 
authority'. While the concept is often applied to iwi, in day-to-day reality it usually manifested itself 
at the hapu level. While iwi was usually an overarching political mechanism, its functions and 
authority in fact tended to reside with its various component rangatira. The Treaty itself recognised 
that chieftainship resided with the various chiefs and their hapu. However, it is the right of iwi and 
hapu, as kinfolk, to determine internally where their authority resides. 
In a contemporary context however, Maori people either as iwi, hapu or whanau have not retained 
anything close to the authority they believed they were simply affirming, that is, their full 
chieftainship over their natural resources. 
The majority of these resources are no longer in Maori 'legal' title but are either owned by the 
Crown, Crown agents, private individuals, or private entities. Ownership ofresources, such as water, 
seabed, foreshore, harbours and other waterways, fish, etc. has been either presumed by the Crown 
or use and allocation rights have been taken by the Crown in a manner akin to ownerShip. The 
resources that the Crown owns or has use rights over continue to be justifiably the target for iwi 
seeking to reclaim those resources which they have always had mana over, and which they in fact 
never gave away. 
Conversely, rangatiratanga in a contemporary Maori context has been reduced to the notion of iwi 
self-management within a legislative framework and context, still rigidly and restrictively defined by 
the Crown; something much less than the notion of full Chieftainship. However, rangatiratanga 
cannot be taken away from iwi, hapu or whanau without its sanction or consent. The meaning that 
iwi may ascribe to them may simply not be acknowledged by the Crown. 
While mediation may try to deal with specific issues, in the background there is a much broader 
tribal context that defines iwi. This context includes such things as tribal and colonial history, 
impacts sustained as a result of colonisation, development pressures, pollution or confiscation of 
resources, and so on. 
While this broad tribal context will always shape the manner in which an iwi, hapu, whanau or 
Maori group approaches a mediation, there are some important process principles for mediation that 
flow from the notion of rangatiratanga. These are: 
_ rangatiratanga means the authority of iwi and its hapu to define their own preferences. 
_ the manner in which an iwi or hapu may choose to exercise its rangatiratanga is a matter for it 
to decide, and no-one else, unless expressly requested. Inter-iwi diversity exists and the right of 
iwi to be different is an expression of iwi rangatiratanga. 
_ intra-iwi diversity exists. There is diversity within iwi, and between hapu and whanau. Only iwi 
and constituent hapu have the right to determine if, how and when this diversity is to be 
reconciled. 
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In the end, the issue defines the scope and nature of the rangatiratanga for a particular mediation 
context. 
The various tiers in the tribal hierarchies of Maori society need to be understood to ensure the 
appropriate unit participates in any mediation. Appropriateness is usually based on who will be 
most affected by a particular proposal whether iwi, hapu, whanau, or any other Maori group. Parties 
need a good understanding of their turangawaewae to determine this. However, there will be parties 
who have had everything taken away from them and who have only their whakapapa. These groups 
still have the right to contribute to decisions about land/resources belonging to their iwi. 
Metge (1976, p.6) defines the four tiers in the tribal hierarchies of Maori society - those of the waka, 
the iwi, the hapu, and the whanau. Place in the hierarchy does not necessarily imply absolute 
control over units further down in the hierarchy. The nature of the dispute or potential impact 
usually determines which unit has the authority to deal with it. An environmental dispute of iwi-
wide importance will naturally require the involvement of iwi as a whole, iwi representatives or any 
other 'voice' sanctioned by iwi. Similarly, more localised disputes of specific concern to a particular 
hapu or even whanau would require the involvement of their chosen representatives in the 
mediation. 
In many cases the appropriate unit will be readily apparent because the area or resource under 
dispute is clearly associated with a particular iwi, hapu, or whanau. Where the association is not 
so clear, or where there may be different groups within a waka, an iwi or hapu who associate with 
an area or resource for possibly different reasons, there needs to be discussion within this wider 
grouping as to which group(s) have a legitimate right to be party to the mediation. 
Once the appropriate unit or units within the tribal hierarchy are decided on either by way of 
consultation and debate or because of past agreements, the decision should not be challenged by 
anyone outside the grouping unless they can substantiate their own traditional legitimacy for being 
party to the mediation. 
As win be apparent, it often takes considerable discussion to decide which level in the tribal 
hierarchy should be involved in the mediation. While the hierarchy may appear to be 
administratively "neat", this appearance can be misleading. For instance, there may be long standing 
disagreements within an iwi, caused by past slights which are unresolved, in the process of being 
resolved, or may never be resolved. It is only through discussion that either these disagreements can 
be sorted out prior to the mediation or pragmatic intra-iwi agreements struck so that progress can 
be made rather than groups be hamstrung by fundamental differences. Similarly, there may be 
instances where legitimate involvement in a mediation overrides the tribal hierarchy to include both 
an iwi and a particular hapu. The principle is that these decisions are the prerogative of the 
hierarchy. 
These comments apply equally to matters of rangatiratanga, manawhenua, ahi kaa and kaitiakitanga. 
Tribal histories are vibrant, and reaction to these histories in contemporary times is equally as 
vibrant. What may have been the case in pre-l840, post-1840 or even last year may not necessarily 
apply tOday. Tribal hierarchies are as dynamic as they have always been. For instance a hapu prior 
to the signing of the Treaty may be considered in contemporary terms to have authority akin to an 
iwi. Similarly, iwi that may have been silent for many years may be revived and revitalised simply 
because descendants may wish to unite under a particular tribal tupuna. 
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As has always been the case, however, and win no doubt continue to be so, the marae is the forum 
where issues relating to tribal hierarchies need to be debated and resolved. 
The principles for mediation are therefore that: 
_ it is imperative that the 'appropriate' organisational unit or units be involved in the mediation, 
_ appropriateness is a matter for the hierarchy i.e. iwi and its constituent hapu or whanau (where 
applicable) to decide, 
ID the issue of appropriateness is not a matter for debate by groupings outside the hierarchy, 
_ when the appropriate unit(s) are identified by the hierarchy their decision should be respected. 
Manawhenua denotes rights to particular lands or resources over which an iwi or hapu has 
customary authority. While the concept is sometimes applied to iwi, it is most applicable at a hapu 
level in that it denotes rights to specific areas and resources within an iwi's territory. In a modern 
Maori context, the right of manawhenua is often applied at the level of the whanau. 
Those with manawhenua status who have moved from their tribal areas would have great difficulty 
being involved because of the practical necessity of shOwing an interest in an issue and following up 
this interest with action. However, where a clear interest and commitment is shown by manawhenua 
who have moved away they would normally clear this with those of their iwi or hapu who have ahi 
kaa. 
Taurahere may only have the rights accorded to other interest groups whereas manawhenua rights 
stem from tupuna connection to the place or area. Therefore those with manawhenua rights should 
have a priority. There may be considerable merit in manawhenua establishing coalitions with 
taurahere as a display of Maori unity and solidarity. 
The principles that manawhenua create for mediation are the need to recognise that: 
_ all places, areas of land and water in this country have their associated iwi, hapu and whanau that 
claim manawhenua rights, 
_ manawhenua can and does exist irrespective of legal ownership of the land or place, 
_ manawhenua rights are based on mana-tupu~a and whakapapa linkages between 
iwi/hapu/Whanau/individual and tupuna associated with the place, 
_ only those who can substantiate, through whakapapa, linkage to the tupuna associated with the 
place have a legitimate right to be party to the mediation, 
_ when the claim to manawhenua right has been established over a particular place it must be 
recognised and respected. 
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Ahi kaa is the highest expression of manawhenua as it denotes not only whakapapa linkage to the 
associated tupuna but also occupation of the place, either by residency or continuing use (i.e. 
Mahinga kai food gathering areas for cultivated food, fishing areas, fowling areas, or areas for 
gathering resources such as flax, kiekie and so on). 
The principles that the concept of ahi kaa implies for mediation are that: 
... the claim of ahi kaa must be supported by the act of occupation or continuing association with 
the particular area or resource, 
.. the group (i.e. hapu or whanau) who can legitimately claim ahi kaa over an area or resource have 
an absolute right to be party to any mediation which affects such areas or resources. 
While the concepts of rangatiratanga, manawhenua and ahi kaa have within them clear notions of 
customary authority over an iwi or hapu's resources, the concept of kaitiakitanga is associated more 
with obligation than authority. It is one thing to have authority over a resource but authority cannot 
exist without obligation. In a Maori context this authority also brings with it an obligation to 
manage the resource wisely. The authority must be managed wisely so that the wellbeing of the iwi 
or hapu is protected and enhanced, and the mana of past, present and future generations of iwi or 
hapu is upheld. 
Kaitiakitanga stresses the need for clear lines of accountability back to the constituency (whether 
iwi, hapu or whanau, both in the present, to tupuna in the past, and to generations in the future). 
It also states as a precondition that kaitiaki have manawhenua and ahi kaa status. Kaitiaki are also 
given their authority (or their authority is invoked) by iwi or hapu, kaumatua, kuia, or tohunga. 
The principles that the concept of kaitiakitanga establishes for mediation are that: 
_ kaitiaki have been given a specific responsibility and task to carry out as guardians, custodians 
of a resource/s and should be involved as a priority in any dispute affecting taonga over which 
they have responsibility, 
... areas over which kaitiaki have responsibility do not necessarily remain in iwi or hapu 'ownership', 
This does not diminish their right to be involved in any mediation affecting these resources. 
Although the concepts of rangatiratanga, manawhenua, ahi kaa and kaitiaki prescribe who has the 
right to be involved, and the nature of that right, a fundamental issue for tangata whenua groups 
is to demonstrate unchallenged manawhenua status in any particular dispute. 
When participation issues have been decided, the Maori group participating in the mediation would 
determine their desired outcome at this stage as well as defining their own bottom line. 
The possibility of iwi/Maori unity in any approach to the mediation might be explored at this stage. 
They may discuss with other interested Maori groups such as taurahere whether it is possible to 
reach agreement on what is the best alternative to mediation, before interfacing with non-iwi and/or 
non-Maori parties to the mediation. The aim, if possible, should be agreement between the different 
Maori groups on the approach to the dispute. The groups may have their own internal conflicts 
which could surface at any time. However, it is important that they at least take the time to 
ascertain whether some of these conflicts can be resolved or at least be put in the background in 
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order to achieve more through solidarity at the mediation. The crucial point is that Maori groups 
recognise the importance of Maori coalition-building at this stage. In the event that an alliance 
forms, the wider group would clarify their desired outcome and reiterate or re-establish a new 
bottom line if necessary. 
The availability of resources in terms of time, money, and people needs to be addressed at this stage. 
Agreements need to be made as to how the costs of representatives and others might be met. In 
natural resource policy disputes where there is a national benefit involved and decisions are being 
made over disputed 'Crown' assets, the parties should not expect to meet their own participation 
expenses. It is the role of the mediator to ensure that funds are available (from the budget of the 
Government agency concerned) to all those who need assistance. Parties should not have to ask. 
In site-specific disputes the Maori party may decide to request that the mediator establishes a 
resource pool with contributions made by those parties that have the means to do so. 
The issue of making resources available to Maori groups who decide they need them to gather 
information will be addressed in Chapter Seven. However, the Maori group may be able to 
negotiate a process with the other parties where large financial resources are not required to bring 
information to the negotiation table. 
6.3 Pre-negotiation or preparation pbase 
Whoever initiates the mediation must attempt to identify relevant iwi interests. Often it is a process 
of elimination as different iwi learn of an issue through word of mouth, publicity or because 'others' 
by experience know of their interest based on past and continuing relationships. 
The responsibility also falls to resource consent agencies who should, if they have not already done 
so, develop familiarity with the different iwi/hapu and representatives in their locality or region. 
This takes time though, and is dependant on mutual respect, trust and a good relationship. 
Iwi may trigger the mediation process if they have decided there is something to be gained from 
using this approach, and then identify and notify other interested parties. The person who triggers 
the mediation may be familiar with resource management issues and responsible for monitoring 
these on behalf of iwi or hapu. Because of this role they may also be well known to resource 
management agencies, developers, etc. 
A meeting would be called by iwi or other parties such as a council (s.99 of the Resource 
Management Act) or a Planning Tribunal Judge (s.268 of the Act) to discuss the possibility of 
mediation. Parties should be informed about the other parties to be involved, and the reason for 
their involvement. 
6.3.1 The mediator 
The choice of the mediator depends on the individual and the issue. The choice must lie with the 
Maori tribes and the other parties. From a Maori perspective, this issue must be left open for iwi 
interpretation and variation. Where no consensus is reached, two mediators should be appointed. 
Possibly a group of potential mediators could be selected initially and then presented to parties for 
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final selection. If an appropriate mediator is not chosen the mediation can break down at a later 
stage. 
It was suggested in the case studies that men and women of Waitangi Tribunal calibre are needed 
as mediators, in other words, people who are respected. Those who have been travelling with the 
Tribunal to hear the claims would be appropriate. (A member of the Waitangi Tribunal who was 
involved at an early stage in one of our cases who had a total commitment to what he was doing, 
who tried to understand, and to fit issues within his brief was strikingly different to other 'mediators' 
who were involved. He allowed everyone the opportunity to hear others' views. He appeared to 
be neutral despite the fact that he is Maori.) However, it is not always easy to find such people and 
those who are available are usually overworked. 
A civil servant is acceptable to some as a mediator. If Government agents are to act as mediators, 
there could be a list of individuals for groups to choose from. 
In traditional Maori society the mediator was often a kaumatua, tohunga or rangatira who had the 
mana and respect of the various parties to the dispute. Today the mediator is still generally a 
person or group of persons who have demonstrated skill, wisdom, political acuity, a sense of fairness 
and whakapapa linkages, and who command respect. 
Some believe it is imperative that the mediator has knowledge of Maori structures and tikanga. 
Others argue that the mediator should at least be open to that knowledge. He/she would be 
expected to learn about manawhenua before approaching parties. He or she would have to know 
the history of the particular area as every tribal tikanga is different. Maori parties involved in a 
mediation would want to know the mediator's historical knowledge of the area. The mediator would 
need to understand the complexities of inter- and intra-iwi diversity. This man or woman would 
attempt to ensure that affected Maori people who had only their whakapapa, for example, would still 
have the right to participate in decision making. 
For some, the mediator may be of any race. Others argue that only Maori mediators fully 
comprehend the depth of the spiritual relationship iwi have with their resources. Maori parties will 
expect the mediator to have a deep understanding of Maori structures, processes, and to be well 
aware of the tribal level of the dispute. This person would be aware that more than one iwi, hapu 
or whanau might need to be involved if different interests or associations with an area or resource 
exist. This is likely to occur particularly if land claims have not been resolved through the Waitangi 
Tribunal. When the appropriate units have been identified that decision should be respected. 
However, iwi are the ones who have to decide for themselves who should participate. (A regional 
authority in one of the case studies now asks Maori groups to demonstrate who has manawhenua 
status that is unchallenged.) It is appropriate for a mediator to ask which iwi, hapu or whanau 
should be involved, but not for proof of identity. 
The mediator must also arrange to have a kaumatua with him or her to advise on what is happening 
and on protocol that may not be understood by a non-Maori mediator or a Maori mediator from 
another tribe. 
The mediator has to have the genuine ability to mediate and not to attempt to change the opinions 
of one group to meet the expectations of another. Such a person has to have the ability to help 
parties to present concepts and to know the right questions to ask that help highlight the problem. 
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Venue becomes irrelevant with a mediator who makes people feel comfortable. He or she must 
have good listening skills, an ability to speak simply, and a capacity to cut through details and reach 
fundamental issues. The parties need to have confidence in the mediator, and his or her respect, 
for the process to work. 
A person who has major responsibilities in a number of areas is probably not suitable as a mediator. 
Parties want to feel that the person is available to participate and has the time to stay and be 
involved. A full-time process facilitator/mediator is needed to hold the process together. There 
could be two mediators mediating; one for the process and one for Maori knowledge. Alternatively, 
a single Maori mediator with a kaumatua consultant from another tribe would be acceptable to the 
tangata whenua. 
The mediator should be able to assist in the analysis of technical information or allowance should 
be made in the protocols to bring in a neutral specialist to do this. A mediation team might be 
required in some cases. 
There should be an initial meeting of all the parties who are involved in the conflict. The mediator 
needs to explain the consensUS-building nature of mediation and the necessity to compromise on 
original pOSitions, both the advantages and disadvantages of mediation, the kinds of goals parties 
may want to achieve, and what the process could involve. Parties need to be aware that mediation 
can involve both face-to-face discussions as well as the mediator meeting with individual groups at 
different times throughout the process. Parties can challenge aspects of the process they do not trust 
or like. They can change the process at any time as long as all parties agree. 
Parties must accept that a degree of compromise is needed if mediation is to be successful. If one 
party states that they refuse to compromise at all, then the other parties need to decide whether they 
want to go ahead without that party, realising that the party has the potential to undermine the 
agreement at a later stage. 
The mediator must be asked to clarify his or her role in the mediation and the power he or she has 
or does not have to make decisions. If the parties do not trust the neutrality of the mediator or that 
person's knowledge of tikanga Maori or the specific area where the conflict is located, they may 
decide not to participate or the mediation may break down at a later stage. 
The parties should expect the mediator to arrange for a full briefing on the history of the conflict 
from the perspective of each party. They should also make certain the mediator is able to remain 
with the parties throughout the whole process. One of the ground rules of the process is that the 
mediator holds information confidentially. 
Parties also need to be aware that political processes and agendas may not be revealed to them 
throughout the mediation. 
During or after a session on the character of mediation the mediator is likely to carry out a conflict 
assessment to determine whether the dispute has the potential to be mediated, that is, whether there 
is room for negotiation. (If there is not, then the parties will have to prepare a new dispute 
resolution strategy as outlined in Chapter Five.) The mediator may have to look for ways of 
repairing previously damaged relationships between or amongst parties. Sometimes Maori people 
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have been talked down to by academics and technical 'experts' during previous encounters and the 
scepticism and mistrust that exists has to be dealt with. 
There are a number of crucial issues that the iwi, hapu, whanau or other Maori group needs to sort 
out before it interfaces with any of the other parties. These issues include - who the representative/s 
should be and how much time is needed to choose them, an accountability process with their people 
(including whether there is a requirement that representatives maintain confidences, for example), 
the mediation approach they prefer, the protocols they wish to follow, the issues they want to see 
on the agenda, choosing a lawyer, and what kind of knowledge and information they want to present 
and in what manner. 
Maori groups must also demand time to consult at this stage if they are being pressed to find a sole 
representative to represent a range of views. 
6.3.2 Negotiators 
In traditional society leadership was based on hereditary right (i.e. rangatira). Each hapu had its 
rangatira who acted as trustee or representative for the group. While rangatira wielded great power, 
this power was checked by the support of those within the group. Chiefs who consistently flouted 
the opinion of their hapu or acted against their interests risked their leadership. 
In contemporary society leadership is often based on a mixture of hereditary right, power of oratory, 
demonstrated skill, proven track record, commitment, education, debating skills, political acuity and 
probably most importantly the continuing support of iwi, hapu or the group being represented. 
The main issue for iwi in respect of environmental mediation is to choose the representative(s) or 
negotiators who singly or collectively can best represent its interests, and have a proven track record 
in doing so. Choosing the 'wrong' representatives obviously diminishes the chance of getting the 
outcome most desired by iwi. The skills required of the tribal representative(s), which can be 
learned and developed and nurtured in those who have 'potential', include an understanding of the 
aspirations of the iwi, a commitment to achieving these aspirations, the ability to listen, articulate 
thoughts clearly, analyse situations, have a good understanding of aU the issues surrounding the 
dispute, and familiarity with all the parties to the mediation and their interests. However, the 
person with the most mana may not be a negotiator or even be present at the mediation. 
In the event that these skills are not found in one person, iwi may wish to establish a negotiation 
team who collectively possess these skills. The crucial Maori requirement however and the 
overriding principle is that iwi or hapu choose their own representative(s) for the mediation. This 
role does not fall to anyone outside the group. Once this decision has been made it should not be 
undermined by any of the other parties to the mediation. 
Maori representatives (negotiators) will be chosen at a hui by their iwi, hapu or whanau. The mana 
of those who are involved must be acknowledged and the decision of iwi, hapu or whanau accepted 
when the right selection process has been gone through. 
Parties have to be aware that they cannot be informed of all that happens within the mediation and 
they therefore need to trust their representative. Disenchanted splinter groups can undermine an 
agreement reached at the end of the day. 
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The principles for mediation are that: 
III the decision of the iwi, hapu or whanau is accepted when the right selection process has been 
gone through, 
.. the mana of tribally sanctioned representative(s) at the mediation must be respected. 
The mediator must be aware that Maori groups need time and resources to choose their 
representatives. Once selected, representatives must seek a mandate from their people on a number 
of key aspects. There may be crucial points in the mediation where key decisions are being taken 
on the agreement, for example, and representatives need to report back to their people. 
Whanaungatanga requires that members are accountable to the whanau for any actions that either 
reflect or have an impact on it as a group. This is equally applicable at the hapu or iwi level; they 
are wider descent or 'family' groupings. 
The inter-generational component ofwhanaungatanga brings an immense pressure to 'perform'. Bad 
decisions or unwise compromise as a result of mediation will not only affect the mana of the whanau 
in the present but also potentially incur the disfavour of and, even worse, have a negative impact 
on past and future generations of the group. 
Effective mediation can only take place if there is recognition of the importance of loyalty and 
accountability to members of the 'group'. Conflict can arise when Maori representatives are torn 
between observing the need for secrecy at some stages of a mediation process, and accountability 
to their tribal group. Maori representatives should discuss this issue with their people before the 
mediation and state their pOSition during the protocol-setting stage on keeping aspects of the 
mediation confidential from their people part way through the process. 
In practical terms whanau support may also be required at the mediation. Maori parties may require 
that other members of their whanau be present to give moral support and encouragement. 
Maori representatives must request sufficient time to consult with their people when considering 
options as part of iwi, hapu or whanau accountability processes. This issue should be discussed at 
the protocol-setting stage so it can be built into the process. Some groups may need outside 
resources to enable them to consult. 
The principles that this implies for mediation are that: 
_ provision should be incorporated into the protocols for members of the whanau grouping to be 
present at the mediation, 
.. the Maori party/ies to the mediation should define their preferred process for reporting back to 
their whanau, 
_ time and resources should be built into any mediation process to allow representatives to report 
to the whanau, 
_ the importance of the whanau's 'inter-generational obligations' needs to be appreciated. 
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6.3.3 Kawa 
The next step is for the representative(s) to secure agreement with his or her people on their 
preferred approach to the mediation, secure legal counsel if that is necessary, and clarify the iwi, 
hapu or Maori group's concerns. 
In traditional Maori society consultation between people of mana was primary. Rangatira negotiated 
konohi ki te konihi. Each Maori group will decide how it wishes to pursue this in a modern 
mediation context. Their preferred approach and the process they wish to follow will then have to 
be negotiated with the other parties. 
The Maori representative or negotiator will seek guidance from his or her people as to what position 
they will take on kawa for the mediation, and how traditional notions can be adapted to a modern 
mediation context. 
The Maori group will decide on their preferred venue for the mediation. They may decide that the 
marae is the only venue they are prepared to consider. Alternatively they may decide to negotiate 
with the other parties for alternating venues to be used so that any competitive advantage can be 
removed. The Maori group may also choose not to mediate at the marae. If the mediation is not 
to be held on the marae for whatever reason, iwi may decide to dispense with certain aspects of its 
hui kawa as it sees fit, or alternatively decide that its involvement requires that the mediation follow 
a certain format or kawa. These decisions should be made before interfacing with non-Maori parties 
so that they (the Maori group) are prepared when it comes to negotiating the protocols with the 
other parties. If Maori protocol is not observed then others are inclined to think that there are no 
Maori representatives in a particular mediation group. A person's cultural background should be 
aCknowledged. 
At the formal welcome on to the marae, marae kawa would have to be respected during whaikorero 
in front of the meeting house. The kawa in front of the meeting house during the mihi is 'not 
negotiable'. Within the meeting house or on the marae, however, and with the approval of both 
representatives and ahi kaa of the marae, the kawa of the mediation after the mihi can be set by 
mutual agreement. The rules other than the need for respect and good sense are flexible. After the 
formal welcome during Waitangi Tribunal proceedings that are held on the marae, for example, the 
normal Tribunal begins in the meeting house. Only those who are giving evidence from iwi may 
speak at a given time in accordance with Tribunal procedure. The process, however, is less formal 
than in the courts. 
An example of how the mihi has been approached was demonstrated in one of the case studies. An 
advisor to a government Minister contacted a member of the hapu to find out the protocols that 
would be involved when the Minister was to visit the marae. The procedure that was decided on 
was that a representative of the hapu was to perform a whai korero on the Minister's behalf, and 
then the Minister would have an opportunity to speak inside after the formal welcome. This action 
shows respect in an appropriate way. 
The issues of the 'right of representatives only' to speak at the mediation should be agreed upon 
during the protocol-setting stage. The mediator would have to clarify rights to speak with the 
parties especially for mediation in the meeting house so that all persons are familiar with the 'kawa' 
laid down for the mediation itself. 
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Te reo Maori is a taonga or treasured possession and is an integral part of Maori culture. It is the 
only way in which Maori concepts can be fully understood. There is considerable mana in being able 
to use Te reo. Many of the traditional leaders and decision makers who will be involved in 
mediation win have Maori as their first and preferred language of expression. The speaking of 
Maori is a right or a necessity and not just a privilege. Those wishing to use Te reo Maori should 
seek to have provision built into the protocols for interpretation services. However, Maori 
participants should be consulted before an interpreter is appointed, and agreements made on how 
the interpretation is to occur. Provisions contained in the Maori Language Act 1987 apply to the 
Resource Management Act. All must be able to participate using the language they feel most 
comfortable with. Neither English nor Maori should be imposed on any of the participants. 
Decisions will need to be made by the parties involved as to whether mediation hui/meetings are to 
be open or closed. Options could range from a limited number of observers associated with each 
party to those with speaking rights only. However, representatives have to be able to report back 
to their people. This issue must be negotiated and attempts made to meet the needs of all parties. 
Parties employing legal counsel should work very closely with them and pay special attention to any 
authority they may give them. Clear working arrangements and authority need to be clarified before 
mediation begins. Time is needed to explain relevant cultural concerns and to be certain that 
relationships with particular pieces of land and/or resources and associated mana are wen 
understood. 
Maori concerns should be clarified so that they can be clearly stated when each of the parties 
presents their perspective on the issues. This tactic is to ensure that tangata whenua issues are not 
pushed aside or subsumed by scientific and technical issues. Groups participating must be sure that 
the mediator has a good understanding of the historical context of the issue and of iwi, hapu and 
whanau's underlying concerns. The mediator must have an understanding of the context and ensure 
that the mediation is historically connected. In essence, he/she must attempt to ensure that the 
process responds to its context and that the outcome is integrated into the future. 
At this point the Maori group should consider how they wish to describe/express their concerns and 
to present their views to the other parties to the best advantage. A format needs to be agreed on 
for information gathering and presentation. Iwi must identify the kind of information/knowledge 
such as history, culture, values and wahi tapu, it needs to present its case. In doing so it needs to 
ascertain what information is not directly available and how this could be made accessible. The 
mediator may be of assistance here. Are financial resources needed to gain this information or to 
bring it to the mediation? Is money available, and if not, are iwi aware of sources that could be 
tapped? A resource pool established by the mediator may provide an opportunity for them to bring 
more information than they might otherwise have been able, especially if the area of particular 
cultural values will not be well understood by the wider mediation group. 
The parties need to be creative and flexible about how they present information. They should try 
to anticipate the information others may need in order to understand the Maori position. In the 
Electricity Corp of N.Z Ltd and Whanganui River Maori Trust Board v. The Manawatu-Wanganui 
Regional Council appeal to the Planning Tribunal (Department of Justice, 1990a, p.12). for example, 
the judge and others were taken to the river itself to help them to understand aspects of evidence 
in cases involving Maori cultural and spiritual values. Historic films of life at marae on the river 
in the 1920s were also viewed. Maori fishermen and others were left to speak directly, and Pakeha 
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were used to link their testimony to the understanding of the Tribunal members (Professor James 
Ritchie, University of Waikato, pers. comm.). 
Precedents such as this could be followed to help those who are not Maori begin to gain some 
understanding of the bases of Maori cultural and spiritual values, how these relate to a resource or 
taonga, and "their responsibilities as rangatira and kaitiaki in respect of it, which ... are protected 
by the Second Article of the Treaty of Waitangi" (ibid.). 
Decisions need to be made as to what information is confidential or sensitive (such as the location 
ofwahi tapu). and if and when it can be divulged either to the mediator and/or to the other patties. 
The use of information has to be negotiated. This is the iwi's choice. However, where iwi clearly 
refuse to disclose sensitive information (for example, the site of an urupa etc.) they need to weigh 
up the potential consequences of non-disclosure. If they do not want to disclose certain information 
the mediation may fail and the dispute would then go to a court hearing where they may feel they 
could be forced to disclose it. 
The possession of information confers a negotiation advantage. However, to have their say, each 
representative also needs to have a sound grasp of the broader issues surrounding the conflict. 
When the Maori group involved has made decisions on all the issues outlined above they could then 
expect to meet with the other parties to negotiate the mediation approach, protocols, and process, 
and to set objectives for the overall mediation. 
6.4 Negotiation phase 
The relevance of the guidelines presented in this section are dependent on the kind of approach and 
process that is negotiated by all the parties in the previous phase. The following suggestions arise 
directly from issues that were identified in the case studies. 
Time should be demanded for parties to develop their cases after information has been gathered and 
presented. Maori parties should then reconfirm for themselves their desired outcome and bottom 
line after having met with other parties. 
The maximum length of time that is reasonable to spend mediating in anyone day should be agreed 
upon when establishing the initial protocols. The length of time spent affects the inequalities and 
power imbalances that already exist. Issues should also be prioritized in terms of time to be 
allocated to the discussion of each. Between one and six hours is the maximum meeting time that 
should be tolerated, according to some of those interviewed in the case studies. Others argue that 
three hours should be the maximum. Morning sessions could be used for the actual mediation, while 
researching, consultation and socialising take place in the afternoon. 
Maori and other representatives may be presented with highly technical information that they do 
not understand and which may not address their concerns. Parties must insist that information is 
simplified so that hours of reading are not needed and that all can understand. If information is 
presented simply and clearly then fewer difficulties arise in interpretation. Information from all sides 
must be demystified so that it is not used to disqualify the ordinary process of understanding. A 
communications person who is able to 'translate' highly technical information should be available 
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to assist both the parties and the mediator. An agreement on 'specialists' could be determined in 
the mediation protocols. 
Parties should also be aware that if concealed information comes to light at a later stage there is 
potential for the agreement to break down. A decision should also be made as to how clashes in 
legal opinion (especially in policy disputes) should be dealt with before the mediation starts. 
Otherwise the mediator can be in the position of acting as a judge through listening to legal opinion 
from counsel of each of the parties and then accepting one interpretation. Parties may agree to 
select an independent legal counsel at the outset and to fund that person from the resource pool 
if one is established. This person would have to be acceptable to all participants. 
To ensure that agreement is actually reached and remains stable, it is essential that the parties 
themselves are involved in suggesting options. Iwi should consider all possible desired iwi outcomes 
and prioritize those outcomes. In doing so they could consider options that may be more readily 
acceptable to the other parties as well as achieving a desired Maori outcome. 
The mediator can also play an important role. He or she should be aware of the interests of all the 
parties, and may be able to propose creative solutions that the parties are unable to see themselves. 
After iwi representatives have met with the other parties they need to report back to their people 
on all the options that have been presented. 
The parties need to reach an agreement themselves rather than allOwing the mediator to impose a 
decision on them. They are then more committed to implementing the agreement and ensuring that 
it remains stable. 
It is recommended that the agreement contains specific details of how it can be implemented and 
by whom. It is important to get a representative cross-section of parties who could take this 
responsibility. It is also wise for representatives to establish a protocol at this stage as to how 
agreement can be maintained and what should be done in the event of the agreement collapsing. 
There may be a need to look for sources of funding for implementation. American authors such as 
McCool (1991) and Talbot (1983) cite examples of difficulties indigenous groups have faced in 
finding sufficient funding to implement a final agreement. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions and recommendations 
7.1 Conclusions 
This publication has responded to the Ministry for the Environment's call for methods of conflict 
resolution that are appropriate to Maori requirements and iwi development in resource management 
activities. The Ministry recognised that cultural conflict arises out of a disparity in power relations 
between the tangata whenua and non-Maori, and that conflict is generally resolved by methods and 
techniques of the dominant culture. The intention of this research has been to explore a process 
of consultation and model of partnership that may be more conducive to iwi development in 
resource management. 
The original research Objective was to develop a bicultural mediation process (through consultation) 
for resource management and environmental disputes in New Zealand. However, the assumption 
underlying the subsequent research effort, namely, that the dynamics of the cultures are not 
equitable, meant that the Objective could not be completely fulfilled at this stage. A prescription 
for one of the necessary preliminaries in developing a truly bicultural mediation process resulted 
rather than an ideal process itself. The outcome of the research has been to recommend an 
approach towards improving Maori effectiveness in environmental mediation. 
A discussion of Maori and Crown principles on the Treaty and the current situation on 
environmental legislation and case law illustrated the context in which resource and environmental 
disputes both arise and are subsequently resolved or not resolved. The various principles that have 
emerged on the meaning of the Treaty define the outer limits within which disputes can be resolved. 
Legislative and case law developments that relate to Maori participation in resource management 
decision making have improved over the past few years but the hypothetical 'playing field' is not 
level. The Crown makes the laws and makes the final decision in resource management decision 
making. The tino rangatiratanga of the iwi is subsumed by Crown claims to sovereignty. 
The Treaty of Waitangi defines one ground and one mode for negotiation but it is not the only one. 
Nor are the Waitangi and Planning Tribunals the only arenas in which negotiations over resource 
ownership, management, and use can take place. It is up to parties to identify alternative grounds 
or search for other modes for resolving environmental and resource disputes. 
The mediation approach described in this publication is one that has been developed in North 
America in particular, and one that is being introduced into this country by visiting trainers from 
the United States in particular. As we have not yet developed an indigenous model of 
environmental mediation of our own it is useful to examine the character of one that is practised 
elsewhere. The potential benefits and limitations of that practice can provide some indications of 
how useful that approach might be in our particular cultural environment in New Zealand. 
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Mediation has the potential to provide a model of partnership and process of consultation that is 
conducive to iwi development and involvement in resource management. Mediation is voluntary -
parties have the power to leave at any stage. Parties 'own' the process and the outcome by 
negotiating these themselves, assisted by an intermediary. Parties are encouraged to focus on what 
they value or their interests, rather than on fixed positions. The face-to-face,. consensus decision-
making approach of environmental mediation parallels that of Maori decision making. 
Views vary on the effects of power imbalances between negotiating parties. An imbalance in 
negotiating expertise, unequal scientific and technical expertise, and differing access to information 
can make mediation unattractive to less powerful parties. Government organisations and private 
corporations are advantaged with a power base endowed by the existing political and economic 
system. Less powerful parties can acquire and enhance their negotiation power before and during 
negotiations if they do some careful preparation. A skilled me.diator can also assist in changing the 
balance of power. 
The model described above was used as a framework to identify issues arising from tangata whenua 
participation in mediation. Participants involved in three disputes over resource ownership, policy 
and use were asked to identify process issues of a bicultural nature. 
While mediation appears to offer a number of valuable opportunities to resolve environmental and 
resource management conflict, there are definite limitations to its attractiveness to iwi. 
Maori parties were given ample opportunities to express their views. Those who had negotiating 
experience or knowledge of the facts and the issues felt empowered. In one case the negotiating 
party was sufficiently aware of a good alternative and of the costs and benefits of taking that course 
of action. The power of a good relationship developed in one case but diminished in another. 
On the other hand, diversity is recognised in non-Maori concerns but inter- and intra-iwi diversity 
is not automatically recognised. In one of the case studies, as in many other instances generally, a 
'Maori representative' was appointed. There is a mistaken perception amongst non-Maori that one 
Maori can represent all Maori interests. 
Maori participation tended to be reactive rather than proactive. Parties did not seem to be aware 
that they, rather than the mediator, can 'own' the process. Access to information was not equal for 
all parties. Western scientific values may prevail or appear to prevail over Maori cultural and 
spiritual values. At times tribal concerns were subsumed by other concerns. The imbalance in 
resources between and amongst parties that occurs with other models (adjudication, negotiation) still 
exists with mediation. 
Mediation practice to date does not represent a partnership model of consultation and participation. 
If it continues to evolve in this way, it may not be conducive to tangata whenua participation in 
resource management decision making. 
Lessons learned from the case studies provided the basis on which an approach was developed for 
more effective participation for Maori interests in environmental mediation. That approach 
comprises two distinct parts. The first is the preparation of a dispute resolution strategy (DRS) 
whereby iwi groups evaluate the dispute resolutions open to them and choose the one that is most 
likely to achieve a desired Maori outcome. Second, in the event that mediation is seen to be the 
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preferred alternative, a specific Maori environmental mediation strategy (EMS) should then be 
devised. These strategies assume a proactive Maori approach to dispute resolution that should 
contribute towards the development of a bicultural mediation process in this country that meets the 
needs of all participating parties. 
It is essential that iwi prepare a DRS for any environmental dispute in which they find themselves. 
The strategy should state what the group wants to achieve; identify opportunities and constraints 
to achieving this outcome; evaluate the various dispute resolution options that are available, 
appropriate and 'affordable'; be flexible to cope with changing circumstances; and define a process 
for implementing and evaluating the agreed strategy. 
Reasons for devising a DRS include encouraging the group to focus on an agreed Maori objective; 
encouraging the group to be proactive rather than reactive to initiatives or processes devised by 
others; empowering the group, within the constraints of the broader societal context, by encouraging 
it to determine what is appropriate, by being organised and have a unity of objective, purpose and 
vision; providing the opportunity for evaluating consistency with other environmental, social, 
cultural and economic Objectives; and considering potential alliances in a particular dispute. 
Although this publication has described the character of one approach to mediation, this may not 
provide sufficient information for a specific dispute. lwi need more detailed information about 
mediation before they can make an informed choice to use this option. There is nowhere for iwi 
to find this kind of information when trying to make a decision. 
The case study findings were used to prescribe the components of an EMS intended to enhance 
Maori effectiveness in cross-cultural disputes over natural and spiritual resources. The strategy 
focused on participation, representation, process and mediator issues. 
The kaupapa outlined in Section 1.2 guided the formulation of the EMS. Process guidelines must 
recognise te tino rangatiratanga 0 te iwi Maori, appropriate pre-negotiation procedures and 
accountability processes that implement tikanga Maori are to be develOped, and mediation processes 
must recognise and provide for the complexity and diversity of Maori society. 
It was apparent from the case studies that in order to participate effectively Maori groups need to 
do a lot of preparation before they interface with non-Maori parties. A pre-pre-negotiation phase 
has been proposed, where fundamental issues with regard to participation need to be addressed. 
The concepts of rangatiratanga, tribal hierarchy, manawhenua, ahi kaa and kaitiakitanga provide the 
basis for determining who has the right to be involved in the resolution of any particular dispute, 
as well as the grounds on which this right is claimed, and the nature of that right. However, a major 
difficulty exists in how to clarify who has the right to be involved and the nature of that right. 
Maori groups need to demonstrate unchallenged manawhenua status. 
In conclusion, mediation has the potential to appeal to all parties. It resembles traditional Maori 
decision-making processes and is sufficiently flexible for multiple cultural norms to be expressed. 
Te tino rangatiratanga can be recognised in the process as can the requirements of fairness and 
legitimacy. The process can be negotiated by all parties so that it meets the needs of those involved. 
As it is a voluntary process, parties have the power to withdraw at any stage. 
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It is vital that the process does not become the cultural possession of one party or another. 
Mediation offers the means for more appropriate values to be articulated in process than do 
traditional conflict resolution approaches. The Maori values of reciprocity and balance, for example, 
may in time come to be stressed as a core element of a bicultural mediation process. 
However, the structural imbalances that exist for iwi are reflected in mediation practice. Although 
mediation implies a 'give and take' approach, in very few situations do Maori have the power to 
'take'. Inevitably they end up compromising. Will iwi groups see incentives to participate or will 
these processes offer more of the same? 
Where iwi legally 'own' the resource (for example, Maori land), where the Crown has simply 
'presumed' ownership (for example, the seabed/foreshore), or where the land has been confiscated, 
iwi will obviously demand greater stakes and may be more reluctant to get involved in mediation. 
There is no right and wrong though. There are only the thoughts of iwi or hapu on what is right 
for them at that particular point in time given what may have been lost (for example, grievances) 
or what may be gained. 
One of the major questions in cross-cultural mediation is whether there can be an acceptance of 
things that are disputed (e.g. land ownership) but about which nothing can be done in a resource 
management mediation forum. The main challenge is to deal with those issues that are not currently 
resolvable. How can we hope to resolve superficial matters when we have major disagreements over 
fundamental matters? How do we achieve as much as we are able, despite the things we cannot 
achieve? 
Few cases of what purists might call mediation have been carried out in this country. The cases 
studied are no exception. Although a lot of useful information has been gathered, three case studies 
are not a sufficient basis for drawing major conclusions. This is particularly so considering that each 
study illustrated a different level of dispute, that is, a Waitangi Tribunal land ownership claim, plus 
a resource policy and a Site-specific dispute. If the recommendations presented at the end of this 
publication are implemented, the guidelines for an EMS need to be tested and evaluated in future 
cross-cultural disputes. 
One of the tasks required in this research was to develop evaluative criteria as a basis for future 
monitoring of the EMS. These criteria are that: 
_ tino rangatiratanga 0 te lwi Maori must be recognised, 
.. appropriate pre-negotiation procedures and accountability processes must occur which implement 
tikanga Maori, 
_ the complexity and diversity of Maori society must be recognised, 
_ a fair process in which all affected groups should be able to participate must be established, 
.. tribal structures must be respected in any conflict resolution process. The identity of tribe is of 
prime importance, followed by hapu boundaries and whanau, 
.. the empowerment of Maori people in the process must be strived for, 
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_ a process that ensures Maori people maintain their mana, dignity, and integrity of their culture 
must be practised, 
... information is presented and exchanged with integrity, 
... parties have an input to the choice of a mediator. 
7.2 Need for action 
In Chapter Six we outlined a strategy for tangata whenua groups when they are involved in the 
mediation of cross-cultural disputes over natural and spiritual resources. The approach is sufficiently 
broad for a limited expression of rangatiratanga of iwi but further action is needed for rangatiratanga 
to be fully expressed in resource management decision making. It is fundamental that the major 
issues discussed below are addressed if mediation is to offer iwi a real alternative to existing 
processes. 
If there is a genuine desire to encourage and enhance iwi participation in the mediation of resource 
management disputes, financial incentives should be institutionalised outside specific mediation 
processes (Moore, 1986, p.34) so they are not vulnerable to political interference at the local level. 
(A case study participant observed that in a formal setting such as a regional council, some 
councillors would dispute the need for special action to be taken when mediating cross-cultural 
disputes. They would take the view that we are all one people, and that everybody has the same 
ability to participate.) 
7.2.1 Funding/jinancial resources 
The inhibitive financial cost of participating in mediation limits access to justice for Maori under 
present planning and resource management decision making. Case study findings showed that apart 
from potential opportunities for Waitangi Tribunal claimants to seek funding assistance to carry out 
research or legal aid, no funding was available for iwi to participate in mediation. We conclude that 
it is crucial for te iwi Maori, as partners to the Treaty, to have access to financial resources, if they 
are needed, to select representatives, gain information/expert advice, and bring Maori environmental 
knowledge to the negotiating table. In the first instance, tangata whenua groups may attempt to 
negotiate a process where Maori participation is valued in its own right where access to large 
amounts of money is not needed. However, a fall-back position is necessary so that groups can still 
participate despite a lack of funding. 
The following is an outline of potential sources of funds for iwi, hapu or whanau who wish to 
participate in mediation. As mediation has the potential to provide savings to the Planning Tribunal 
process, and therefore to the nation, funds could be appropriated from the Consolidated Fund 
(Vote:Justice). In the United States, for example, funding for negotiations over Indian water rights 
comes out of the same 'purse' as funding for litigation (McCool, 1991, pp.12-14). 
In mediations over national resource policy issues, in particular, funding should be available for 
parties to participate. If decisions made as a result of the mediation benefit the whole country then 
there is a case for Government funding. 
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It is preferable for iwi not to be dependent on institutionalised legal aid (Advisory Committee on 
Legal Services, 1986, p5) but aid should be available for those who have no other source of funds. 
At present many are unable to participate because legal aid is not available and this situation does 
not appear likely to change under the reintroduced Legal Services Bill. It is critical that Maori 
groups have access to legal aid for Planning Tribunal proceedings (eligibility criteria would have to 
be determined). 
Section 26 of the Resource Management Act states that "the Minister for the Environment may 
make grants and loans .... to assist in achieving the purpose of this Act". A fund could be 
established under this provision that makes monies available to iwi, hapu and whanau or to 
community groups who may wish to participate in mediation but have few financial resources. 
A research fund has been set up under a trust deed by the Crown to enable claimants and the Crown 
to negotiate a settlement over forestry claims that are before the Waitangi Tribunal (Department 
of Justice, 1990b, p.3). The fund is intended to assist the Tribunal's own research work. A similar 
fund could be set up to enable iwi to carry out research for proceedings relating to the Planning 
Tribunal and assist the Tribunal's research work. 
There is provision in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 for legal aid to be made available to claimants 
who have filed claims with the Waitangi Tribunal. An investigation needs to be carried out as to 
whether the underlying philosophy could offer a precedent for resolving disputes other than those 
filed with the Waitangi Tribunal. 
7.2.2 Advice for Maori on conJlict resolution 
If iwi are to participate effectively in environmental mediation they need advice on how the legal 
system works, in general, and on mediation in particular. They need advice on preparing a DRS. 
There is also a lack of awareness as to how parties could actually enter a mediation process if they 
wished to. (In the summary of grievances in the Ngai Tahu Waitangi Tribunal report it was noted 
that Ngai Tahu needed a protector to independently advise them of their Treaty and other rights 
at the time of the Crown land purchases (Waitangi Tribunal, 1991, p.122).) 
The authors of Te Whainga i Te Tika (1986, pp.86-87) refer to a pilot study carried out by the 
Environmental Defence Society to see how 'environmental aid' could best be provided. The study 
report recommended that an Environmental Defenders Office be established that would, among 
other things, provide advice to community groups and individuals if requested, and assess requests 
for grants by community groups to participate in the environmental and planning process. It would 
ensure that "some staff have special expertise and understanding of Maori values to assist Maori 
groups". To ensure that its services were available throughout the country, the authors of 
Te Whainga i Te Tika proposed that the Office be administered through an independent Legal 
Services Commission. (The Commission should reflect an emphasis on consumer control and 
bicultural power sharing (ibid. p.91).) 
We recommend that a nationwide service be established to provide iwi with the kind of information 
referred to above. An investigation needs to be carried out as to where this service could best be 
situated. 
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7.2.3 Dissemination of information in this publication to iwi 
The information contained in this publication should not be disseminated to iwi in this form. 
Guidelines need to be prepared, possibly in a handbook or pamphlet form, and put out by 
Maruwhenua Secretariat of the Ministry for the Environment. The Secretariat could advise readers 
of the existence of this publication through its newsletter. 
The findings could be presented to the National Maori Congress by the authors and then processes 
for determining how the information must be disseminated to iwi could be determined. 
7.2.4 Information for those interfacing with iwi 
While this publication has been targeted at iwi, the information presented has limited value if those 
who interface with iwi (for example, regional councils, territorial authorities, developers, mediators) 
are not aware of the kinds of issues that are of concern to Maori groups, and the demands that 
might be made by iwi with regard to any mediation practice. A practical interpretation of some of 
the information contained in this publication should be prepared for distribution to those who have 
a duty to consult with iwi under the Resource Management Act. 
People like Buddy Mikaere and John Kneebone of the Waitangi Tribunal could play an important 
role in explaining the mediation model to councillors who are not familiar with tikanga Maori. Such 
an initiative has already been adopted by a council involved in one of the case studies to explain the 
Waitangi Tribunal (and issues with regard to land confiscations) to councillors. 
A further component of this task is to investigate means of bringing together information and values 
from tribal and Western colonial cultures. We recommend that processes used in New Zealand and 
in Canada and Australia are closely examined. 
7.2.5 Changes to statutory requirements 
Findings in the case studies suggest that some changes should be made to current environmental 
legislation, particularly the Resource Management Act, with regard to access to information and the 
mediator. 
Access to information was not balanced in all of the case studies. The Advisory Committee on Legal 
Services (1986, p.88) advocates access to information on proposals at the initial stages of projects 
or proposals with significant environmental impacts. 
Clause 28[1] of Bill C-78, which establishes a Canadian environmental assessment process, offers an 
important guideline that should be incorporated into the Resource Management Act. 
"(a) mediator shall not proceed with a mediation unless the mediator is satisfied that 
all of the information required for a mediation is available to an of the participants" 
(House of Commons of Canada, 1990). 
The authors of this publication believe that there is a crucial need for a stronger set of provisions 
on mediation than those that are scattered throughout the Resource Management Act. A more 
coherent statement is required as to the role mediation will play in planning and environmental 
matters. 
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Section 85 of the Resource Management Act allows for mediation to be used in pre-hearing 
meetings while s.415 empowers a Planning Tribunal judge to ask one of its members or another 
person to conduct mediation. We are concerned about the lack of provisions over who the mediator 
should be, and about the need for more explicit statements as to their powers and liabilities. There 
are no qualifications as to the skills, qualities or experience required of the mediator. This is a 
critical issue in cross-cultural mediation. 
The Canadian legislation developed to establish a federal environmental assessment process requires 
that where a project is referred to mediation the Minister of the Environment appoints a person 
possessing the required knowledge or experience (House of Commons of Canada, 1990, p.16). 
The Family Courts Act 1980, s.S also requires that a Family Court Judge is a person who, by reason 
of his/her trainin~ experience and personality is a suitable person to deal with matters of family law. 
The Resource Management Act should adopt similar minimum guidelines. 
There is a crucial need for trained mediators in both mediation as a conflict resolution technique, 
who also have a deep understanding of taha and take Maori. It is important that a pool of 'resource 
mediators' is developed; people who are not attached to any particular body. 
7.3 Recommendations 
The authors recommend that: 
OR the feasibility of establishing a nationalised conflict resolution information service for Maori 
groups be investigated, 
.. the feasibility of establishing regional and local services that offer independent advice on conflict 
resolution for Maori groups be investigated, 
... the means by which people can find out the grounds on which Maori groups claiming the right 
to participate in conflict resolution and the nature of that right be investigated, 
.. a guide for Maori groups containing information on legislational opportunities for participation 
in resource management decision making be prepared, 
... potential sources of funding enabling Maori groups to participate effectively in environmental 
mediation be investigated, 
'" changes to the Resource Management Act in order to provide a stronger set of provisions on 
mediation that would also ensure Maori effectiveness in mediation be investigated, 
... guides on mediation for agencies and individuals that interface with Maori groups 
e.g. government departments, regional councils, local authorities, consent use applicants, 
mediators, etc. be prepared, 
... methods of cross-cultural environmental information eXChange both in New Zealand, canada and 
Australia be investigated. 
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Appendix 1. The Treaty of Waitangi 
Ke kupu whakataki 
MAORI VERSION 
Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi 
Ko Wikitoria te Kuini 0 Ingarani i tana mahara atawai ki nga rangatira me nga haptl 0 Nu Tirani 
i tana hiahia hold kia tohungia ki a ratou 0 ratou rangatiratanga me to ratou wenua a kia mau 
tonu hoki te rongo ki a ratou me te Atanoho hoki kua wakaaro ia he mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi 
rangatira hei kai wakarite ki ngfl Tangata Maori 0 Nu Tirani kia wakaaetia e nga rangatira Maori 
te Kawanatanga 0 te Kuini ki nga wahikatoa 0 te wenua nei me nga motu - na te mea hoki he 
tokomaha ke naa tangata a tona Iwi kua noho ki tenei wenua a e haere mai nei. 
Na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino e puta mai ki te 
tangata MIlori ki te PIlkeha e noho ture kore ana. 
Na kua pai te Kuini kia tukua ahau a Wiremu Hopihona he Kapitana i te Roiara Nawi hei Kawana 
mo ngIl wflhi katoa 0 Nu Tirani i tukua aianei a mua atu ki te Kuini e mea atu ana ia ki nga 
rangatira 0 te wakaminenga 0 ngfla hapu 0 Nu Tirani me era rangatira atu enei ture ka KOrerotia 
nei. 
Ko Te Tuatahi 
Ko ngIl rangatira 0 te Wakaminenga me nga rangatira katoa hoki, kihai i uro ki taua Wakaminenga, 
ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini 0 Ingarangi ake tonu atu te Kawanatanga katoa 0 0 ratou wenua. 
Ko Te Tuarua 
Ko te Kuini 0 Ingarangi ka wakarite ka wakaae ki ngaa rangatira, ki nga haptl, ki nga tangata katoa 
o Nu Tirani, te tino rangatiratanga 0 0 ratou wenua 0 ratou kainga me 0 ratou taonga katoa. 
Otiia ko nga rangatira 0 te Wakaminenga me nga rangatira katoa atu, ka tuku ki te Kuini te 
hokonga 0 era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona te wenua, ki te ritenga 0 te utu e wakaritea ai 
e ratou ko te kaihoko e meatia nei e te Kuini hei kaihoko mona. 
Ko Te Tuatoru 
Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te wakaaetanga ki te Kawanatanga 0 te Kuini. Ka tiakina e te 
Kuini 0 Ingarangi nga tangata Maori katoa 0 Nu Tirani. Ka tukua ki a rIltou nga tikanga katoa 
rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata 0 Ingarangi. 
Na, ko matou ko nga rangatira 0 te Wakaminenga 0 nga haptl 0 Nu Tir~ni ka huihui nei ki 
Waitangi ko matou hoki ko nga rangatira 0 Nu Tirani ka kite nei i te ritenga 0 enei kUpu. Ka 
tangohia ka wakaaetia katoatia e matou. Koia ka tohungia ai 0 matou ingoa 0 matou tohu. 
Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi i te ono 0 nga ra 0 Pepueri i te tau kotahi mano, e waro rau e wa te 
kau 0 to tatou Ariki. 
69 
Treaty of Waitangi: a literal English translation of the Maori text 
(Signed at Waitangi February 1840, and afterwards by about 500 chiefs) 
VICfORIA, the Queen of England, in her kind (gracious) thoughtfulness to the Chiefs and Hapus 
of New Zealand, and her desire to preserve to them their chieftainship and their land, and that 
peace and quietness may be kept with them, because a great number of the people of her tribe have 
settled in this country, and (more) will come, has thought it right to send a chief (an officer) as one 
who will make a statement to (negotiate with) Maori people of New Zealand. Let the Maori chiefs 
accept the governorship (KAWANATANGA) of the Queen over all parts of this country and the 
Islands. Now, the Queen desires to arrange the governorship lest evils should come to the Maori 
people and the Europeans who are living here without law. Now, the Queen has been pleased to 
send me, William Hobson, a Captain in the Royal Navy to be Governor for aU places of New 
Zealand which are now given up or which shall be given up to the Queen. And she says to the 
Chiefs of the Confederation of the Hapus of New Zealand and the other chiefs, these are the laws 
spoken of. 
Article the first 
The Chiefs of the confederation, and all these chiefs who have not joined in that Confederation give 
up to the Queen of England for ever all the Governorship (KAWANATANGA) of their lands. 
Article the second 
The Queen of England agrees and consents (to give) to the Chiefs, hapus, and all the people of New 
Zealand the full chieftainship (rangatiratanga) of their lands, their villages and all their possessions 
(taonga: everything that is held precious) but the Chiefs give to the Queen the purchasing of those 
pieces of land which the owner is willing to sell, subject to the arranging of payment which will be 
agreed to by them and the purchaser who will be appointed by the Queen for the purpose of buying 
for her. 
Article the third 
This is the arrangement for the consent to the governorship of the Queen. The Queen will protect 
all the Maori people of New Zealand, and give them all the same rights as those of the people of 
England. 
WILLIAM HOBSON, Consul and Lieutenant-Governor 
Article the fourth 
Two churchmen, the Catholic Bishop, Pompallier and the Anglican Missionary William Colenso 
recorded a discussion on what we would call religious freedom and customary law. In answer to a 
direct question from Pompallier, Hobson agreed to the following statement. It was read to the 
meeting before any of the chiefs had signed the Treaty. 
E mea ana te Kawana ko ng:t whakapono katoa 0 Ingarani, 0 ng:t Weteriana, 0 Roma, me te 
ritenga Maori hoki e tiakina ngatahitia e ia. 
Translation: 
The Governor says that the several faiths (beliefs) of England, of the Wesleyans, of Rome, and also 
Maori custom shall alike be protected by him. 
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Preamble 
ENGLISH VERSION 
The Treaty of Waitangi 
Her Majesty, Victoria, Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, regarding with 
her Royal Favour the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand, and anxious to protect their just 
Rights and Property, and to secure to them the enjoyment of Peace and Good Order, has deemed 
it necessary, in consequence of the great number of Her Majesty's Subjects who have already settled 
in New Zealand, and the rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is 
still in progress to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorised to treat with the 
Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty's Sovereign authority over the whole 
or any part of these islands. Her Majesty therefore being desirous to establish a settled form of Civil 
Government with a view to averting the evil consequences which must result from the absence of 
the necessary Laws and Institutions alike to the Native population and to Her Subjects has been 
graciously pleased to empower and authorise me William Hobson, a Captain in Her Majesty's Royal 
Navy, Consul, and Lieutenant-Governor of such parts of New Zealand as may be or hereafter shall 
be ceded to Her Majesty, to invite the confederated and independent Chiefs of New Zealand to 
concur in the following Articles and Conditions. 
Article the first 
The chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and 
independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation, cede to Her Majesty the 
Queen of England, absolutely and without reservation, all the rights and powers of Sovereignty 
which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be 
supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof. 
Article the second 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New 
Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof, the fun exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of the Lands and Estates, Forests, Hsheries, and other properties which they may 
collectively or individually possess, so long as it is their wish and desire to maintain the same in their 
possession; but the Chiefs of the United Tribes and the Individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the 
exclusive right of Pre-emption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to 
alienate, at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective proprietors and persons 
appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf. 
Article the third 
In consideration thereof, Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand 
Her Royal Protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British subjects. 
w. Hobson, Lieutenant-Governor 
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Article the fourth 
Now therefore, We the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand being 
assembled in Congress at Victoria, in Waitangi and We the Separate and Independent Chiefs of New 
Zealand claiming authority over the Tribes and Territories which are specified after our respective 
names having been made fully to understand the Provision of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter 
into the same in the full spirit and meaning thereof. In witness of which, we have attached our 
signatures or marks at the places and the dates respectively specified. 
Done at Waitangi, this sixth day of February in the year of Our Lord, one thousand eight hundred 
and forty. 
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Appendix 2. Crown principles for action on the Treaty 
In 1989 the third Labour Government also defined a set of principles for Crown action on the 
Treaty. These principles were intended to guide the Crown's behaviour in its dealings with any 
issues arising out of the Treaty of Waitangi. They included: 
[a] The principle of government - the kawanatanga principle 
"The Government has the right to govern and to make laws". 
"The first Article of the Treaty gives expression to the right of the Crown to make laws and 
its obligation to govern in accordance with constitutional process. This sovereignty is 
qualified by the promise to accord the Maori interests specified in the second Article an 
appropriate priority." 
[b] The principal of self-management - the rangatiratanga principle 
"The iwi have the right to organise as iwi, and under the laws, to control their own 
resources." 
"The second Article of the Treaty guarantees to iwi Maori the control and enjoyment of 
those resources and taonga which it is their wish to retain. The preservation of a resource 
base, restoration of iwi self-management, and the active protection of taonga, both material 
and cultural, are necessary." 
[c] The principal of equality 
"All New Zealanders are equal before the law." 
"The third Article of the Treaty constitutes a guarantee of legal equality between Maori and 
other citizens of New Zealand. This means that all New Zealand citizens are equal before 
the law .... " 
[€I] The principle of reasonable co-operation 
"Both the Government and the iwi are obliged to accord each other reasonable co-
operation on major issues of common concern." 
"The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a fair basis for two peoples in one 
country. Duality and unity are both significant. Duality implies distinctive cultural 
development and unity implies common purpose and community ... " 
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Reasonable co-operation can only take place if there is consultation on major issues of common 
concern and if good faith, balance and common sense are shown on all sides. The outcome of 
reasonable co-operation will be partnership". 
[e] The principle of redress 
"The government is responsible for providing effective processes for the resolution of 
grievances in the expectation that reconciliation can occur". 
"The Crown accepts a responsibility to provide a process for the resolution of grievances 
arising from the Treaty. This process may involve courts, Waitangi Tribunal or direct 
negotiation. The provision of redress, where entitlement is established must take account 
of its practical impact and of the need to avoid the creation of fresh injustice. If the Crown 
demonstrates commitment to this process of redress then it will expect reconciliation to 
result." 
While there is nothing to guarantee that the National Government will retain these as Crown 
principles their Minister for Maori Affairs has frequently expressed a preference for direct 
negotiation between Crown and iwi to settle any claims over breach of the Treaty. 
The principles referred to may very well therefore continue as Crown principles on the Treaty 
without any significant changes. 
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Appendix 3. Waitangi Tribunal claims 
[a] Kaituna River Claim 
(Wai 4: Charles Bennett and others - Te Arawa, 1984). 
This claim dealt with Te Arawa objections to a proposed nutrient pipeline to pump effluent 
from Rotorua to the Kaituna River. The Tribunal agreed that the cultural and spiritual 
interests of Te Arawa in respect of the river would be compromised and on its (i.e. The 
Tribunal's) recommendation the Government abandoned the proposal. 
[b] Motonui Claim 
(Wai 6: AHa Tayor - Te Atiawa, 1983). 
This claim dealt with Te Atiawa objections to a proposed outfall for the synthetic fuels 
plant at Motonui. The claim was that the outfall would pollute the miles of coastal reef 
traditionally fished by Te Atiawa and therefore contravened Maori fishing rights guaranteed 
by the Treaty. The Tribunal found in favour of the claimants and as a result of Te Atiawa's 
willingness to accommodate the 'national interest' alternative arrangements were to be 
investigated at Waitara. 
[c] Manukau Harbour Claim 
(Wai 8: Nganeko Minhinnick - Ngati Te Ata & Tainui, 1985). 
A comprehensive claim dealing with Tainui concerns over despoliation and confiscation of 
the Manukau harbour and surrounding lands and environments. Tainui claimed consistent 
Crown failure to recognise the tribes' 'Treaty rights' and that its promulgation of numerous 
acts and policies means " ... the tribal enjoyment of the lands and fisheries has been and 
continues to be severely prejudiced by compulsory acquisitions, land development, industrial 
development, reclamations, waste discharges, zonings, commercial fishing and the denial of 
traditional harbour access (p.lO!)". 
The Tribunal seriously questioned the good faith of the Crown under the Treaty and 
recommended that the Crown initiate sweeping changes to resource legislation dealing with, 
amongst other things, fisheries, water management, planning, antiquities, and reparation for 
site-specific grievances of the Tainui people. While some of the Tribunal's 'minor' 
recommendations have been acted on, there is still considerable discontent that the 
substantive parts dealing with harbour reparation remain unresolved. 
[d] Orakei Claim 
(Wai 9: Joe Hawke - Ngati Whatua, 1987). 
This dealt with Ngati Whatua claims that they had been virtually rendered landless by the 
activities of successive governments between the 1860s and the 19508, particularly with 
respect to the 700-acre Orakei Block, the Tribe's main base, which was important to them 
and which they claimed ought to have been reserved for them. 
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The Tribunal found that the Crown had failed to meet its obligations to the Ngati Whatua 
by various acts and omissions which resulted in the lack of a sufficient land endowment for 
the tribe. It recommended certain lands in and around Orakei by vested in the tribe and 
that the Crown make a financial endowment (i.e. $3,000,000) to assist with tribal 
development and housing. The Crown subsequently paid the tribe this endowment. 
[e] Waiheke Claim 
(Wai 10: Hariata Gordon - Ngati Paoa, 1987). 
This claim was based on concerns that the Crown oUght to have passed 2050 acres of 
farmland, land known as the Waiheke Development Scheme, back to the Ngati Paoa Tribe 
rather than to private interests. The claim was that tribes like Ngati Paoa were so laCking 
in land and other endowments that they were threatened with extinction. The Tribunal 
found in favour of the claimants and its single recommendation was that the Crown 
negotiate with the various parties to seek a return of the land to Ngati Paoa. These 
negotiations resulted in the land being handed back to the tribe in 1990 and registered in 
the title of the ancestor Paoa. 
The Commission for the Environment's (1983) Environmental audits and appraisals 1976-81: a 
review is an important source of information on some Waitangi Tribunal claims. 
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Appendix 4. Statutory framework 
[a] Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 
Establishes the Waitangi Tribunal to make recommendations to the Crown on the practical 
application of the Treaty and to determine whether particular actions of the crown have 
been inconsistent with its principles. The Tribunal has 'exclusive authority' to determine 
the meaning of the Treaty and to attempt to reconcile differences that exist between the two 
texts. Allowed the hearing of grievances arising from Crown action after 1975. 
[b] Fisheries Act 1983 
Establishes a management regime for fisheries, and in section 88 (2) provides that nothing 
in the Act shall affect any Maori fishing right. 
[c] Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 19.85 
Extends the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal to consider claims from the signing of the 
Treaty on 6 February 1840 to the present. 
[d] State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 
Provides for the transfer of certain government assets including significant natural resources 
such as forests and coal and crown lands to state owned trading enterprises. The Act is 
particularly significant because of the transfer of assets from one of the Treaty partners i.e. 
the Crown, to a business enterprise. Section 9 states that "Nothing in this Act shall permit 
the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi". 
[e] Environment Act 1986 
Establishes offices of the Ministry for the Environment and the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment. The preamble defines it as an Act to "ensure that in 
the management of natural and physical resources full and balanced account is taken of ... 
(amongst other things) the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi". Section 17 also requires 
the Commissioner to have regard to "any land, water, sites, fishing grounds or cultural 
resources or interests associated with such areas which are part of the heritage of the 
tangata whenua and contribute to their well-being". 
[i] Conservation Act 1987 
An Act to promote the conservation of the country's natural and historic resources, it 
establishes the Department of Conservation to administer various statutes which deal with 
conservation of these resources. Section 4 of the Act states, "this Act shall be so 
interpreted as to give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi". 
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[g] Maori Language Act 1987 
An Act which declares the Maori language to be an official language of New Zealand, and 
confers the right to speak Maori in certain legal proceedings (such as Planning Tribunal and 
Waitangi Tribunal hearings, and judicial proceedings in front of the Court of Appeal, High 
Court, District Court and so on). It states in the preamble that" ... in the Treaty of 
Waitangi the Crown confirmed and guaranteed to the Maori people ... all their taonga 000 
the Maori language is one such taonga". 
[h] Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 
In regard to the transfer of Crown assets to a State Owned Enterprise, this Act gives the 
Waitangi Tribunal power to make binding recommendations leading to the return to Maori 
ownership of Crown lands or interests in such lands transferred to SOEs where such 
transfer is found by the Tribunal to be in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
This Act was a direct result of the Court of Appeal's ruling in the New Zealand Maori 
Council Case (see below). The Coalcorp case (see below) further defined assets or interests 
on the land such as coal (and not just the land) to also be subject to this qualification. 
[i] Maori Fisheries Act 1989 
"An Act ... to make better provision for the recognition of Maori fishing rights secured in 
the Treaty of Waitangi". It attempts to facilitate the entry of Maori into the activity of 
fishing by creating a Maori Fisheries Commission, and Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd and providing 
for the transfer of fishing quota from the Crown to the Commission. Part l11A provides 
for the establishment of Taiapure-Local fisheries (under section 54A) for waters customarily 
of special significance to iwi or hapu either as a source of food or for spiritual or cultural 
reasons. 
U1 Transit New Zealand Act 1989 
An Act which abolished the New Zealand Roads Board (with responsibility for roads, 
motorways, highways) and the Urban Transport Council (with responsibility for passenger 
transport) and passed these over to Transit New Zealand. 
The Act requires land transport programmes to be prepared by district and regional councils 
identifying transport needs for that year. Section 27 states "No project which affects or is 
likely to affect Maori land or Maori historical, cultural or spiritual interests shall be 
included in any (district or regional) land transport programme unless the local authority 
responsible for the project has consulted every iwi or hapu ... which may be affected ... ". 
[k] Crown Forests Assets Act 1989 
An Act to allow the Crown to sell its forestry assets while at the same time protecting 
claims to the Waitangi Tribunal by Maori people. It resulted from the Crown's attempt to 
avoid application of the Treaty of Waitangi (SOE) Act, by proposing to sell cutting rights 
(though not land) out of Forest Corps holdings. 
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[I] Foreshore and Seabed Endowment Revesting Bill 1989 
The Bill seeks to revoke certain endowments of foreshore and seabed vested in various 
harbour boards and territorial authorities, and revest these endowments in the crown. 
Central government recognises that endowments of foreshore and seabed to harbour boards 
and territorial authorities represents the only significant departure from total Crown 
'ownership' and control of foreshore and seabed. It is also implicitly recognised in the Bill 
that Treaty claims to Maori ownership of the coastal resource can not be properly addressed 
until such endowments are returned to the Crown. 
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Appendix 5. Resource Management Act 1991 
Especially important provisions to be aware of: 
Section 6 lists the matters of national importance which resource management agencies shall 
recognise and provide for including at Section 6(e) "the relationship of Maori people and their 
culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, waters, sites, waahi tapu and other taonga." 
Section 7 states that such agencies shall have particular regard to other matters including at 
Section 6(a) "Kaitiakitanga." 
Section 8 states resource management agencies shall " ... take into account the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi)." 
Other relevant provisions include: 
Section 33 which provides for the transfer of certain powers from local authorities to other 
public authorities including at Section 33(2) " ... iwi authority ... " 
In respect of the various national, regional, district and coastal policy statements and plans the Act 
requires: 
National Policy Statements 
Section 45(2)(h) states that in determining whether it is desirable to prepare a national policy 
statement the Minister may have regard to "anything which is significant in terms of Section 8 
(Treaty of Waitangi)." 
National Coastal Policy Statements 
Section 58(b) states that these may state policies in respect of " ... protection of the 
characteristics of the coastal environment of special value to tangata whenua including waahi 
tapu, tauranga waka, mahinga maataitai and taonga raranga." 
Regional Policy Statements and Regional and District Plans 
In preparing or changing regional policy statements or Regional and District Plans the relevant 
regional council (i.e. pursuant to Section 61(2)(a)(ii) and Section 66(2)(b)(ii) or territorial 
authority (pursuant to Section 74(2)(b)(ii) shall have regard to any "relevant planning 
document recognised by an iwi authority affected by the ... policy statement." 
Section 65 also defines circumstances under which regional plans may be prepared, including 
at Section 65(3)(e) "any significant concerns of tangata whenua for their cultural heritage in 
relation to natural and physical resources." 
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In respect of heritage protection Section 187 defines the Minster of Maori Affairs or any local 
authority acting on its own motion or recommendation of an iwi authority as a heritage protection 
authority. Section 188 states that any body corporate may apply to the Minister of Conservation to 
be a Heritage Protection Authority. 
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Appendix 6. Court of Appeal case law 
[a] New ZeaImui Maori Council v. Attorney General, 1987 (CA 54/87) 
The court held it to be a breach of the Treaty to allow the transfer of land from the Crown 
to a state owned enterprise (and then potentially to a private citizen or business), without 
allowing for the return of such land in the event of a successful claim to the Waitangi 
Tribunal. The case gave rise to the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988. 
A landmark case that brings the Treaty into the core of the New Zealand legal system by 
defining a series of principles of the Treaty, which are now enforceable by law. 
[b] Environmental Defence Society v. Mangonui County Council (CA 56/88) and Taitokerau District 
Maori Council v. Mangonui County Council (CA 57/88 1988 (Karikari Case) 
This case dealt with a proposed tourist resort on the Karikari Peninsula, Northland. In 
terms of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 the court stated that while matters 
defined as being of national importance under section 3, including 3(1)(g) "the relationship 
of the Maori people and their culture and traditions with their ancestral land", had to be 
weighted with each other they had priority over matters defined in section 4 of the Act. 
Of considerable significance is the fact that the Court took the opportunity to approve 
I 
unanimously the decision of the High Court in the Habgood case which defined ancestral 
land as 'land of our ancestors'. 
lel Mahuta v. Attorney General 1989 (CA 129/89) (Coalcorp Case) 
Another landmark case in which the court ruled that Government could not sell coal mining 
rights to Coalcorp without built-in safeguards for the Tainui people. The Crown had a 
responsibility to establish a process to protect Maori interests not only in land but 'interests' 
on the land (Le. coal) pursuant to Section 9 of the Treaty of Waitangi (SOE) Act 1988. 
Government's intention to transfer mining rights (or interests) separately to the transfer of 
land was an attempt to frustrate the purposes of the Act. It breached the obligations 
incumbent on Treaty partners to act in good faith, and with reasonableness towards each 
other. 
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Appendix 7. Background to the case studies 
I. WAITOMO CLAIM 
Some background information on this case can be found in "The Dominion" (1989), "The Press" 
(1990), Department of Justice (1989, 1990). 
Because of the present state of negotiations, further background information cannot be released 
until the mediation has been finalised. 
II. SOUTH WESTLAND SOUTH OF THE COOK RIVER INDIGENOUS FORESTS 
Background information on this case can be found in Ministry for the Environment (1987), Ministry 
for the Environment (1988a) and (1988b). 
1. The problem 
Part of the fourth Labour Government's major reform of environmental administration involved the 
allocation of State-owned indigenous forests to either the new Forestry Corporation for wood 
production or to the Department of Conservation for reservation. The Government needed to 
resolve the conflict over the West Coast forests quickly in order to proceed with its reform. The 
Minister for the Environment, on advice of his Ministry, proposed a mediation process rather than 
a Cabinet decision. 
In 1986 the newly-appointed Secretary for the Environment was directed by the Cabinet Policy 
Committee to consult with representatives of relevant government agencies, the (then) West Coast 
United Council, environmental, community and industry groups. The intent was to secure an agreed 
package for the allocation of State forests for reservation and production. The Secretary set up a 
process that was designed to facilitate maximum consultation and public participation. It appears 
that there may have been problems with the process. The outcome that emerged is now referred 
to as the 'West Coast Accord'. 
"The forests of South Westland (south of the Cook River) were under a logging moratorium until 
1990, during which a comprehensive management evaluation programme was being carried out on 
the resources of the region. This research programme was not completed in time for the results to 
be used in the rest of the West Coast Forests exercise, so (in November 1986) Government directed 
the Secretary for the Environment to undertake a similar exercise for the South Westland forests" 
(Gibson, 1988, p.7) south of the Cook River. The Secretary's brief also required consideration to 
be given to the effect of decisions made with regard to forest management on other natural 
resources within the forest area. 
One of the key issues was to identify podocarp timber supply for Whataroa and Hari Hari till 2025 
when timber from special plantings would become available. There were important implications for 
both of those communities if supplies would not be available from the South Westland forests south 
of the Cook River. 
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This particular area also included land and other resources that are part of the Ngai Tahu claim that 
was before the Waitangi Tribunal. One of the major problems for the Tai Poutini people in this 
region has been land tenure. During the Arahura Purchase, Crown agents presumed that no Maori 
people lived south of Okarito and little land was allocated to Te Koeti Turanga hapu. The 
Katiwaewae hapu to the north of this area has land holdings in the case study area. 
At the same time the conservation movement was lobbying the Government to declare all of the 
South Westland Forests, along with existing national parks, a World Heritage Area. Local and 
regional government has been totally opposed to the proposals because any form of timber 
production would be prevented (Gibson, 1988, p.7). 
2. The process 
The Secretary for the Environment convened the Working Party on South Westland south of the 
Cook River early in 1987. (The Ministry has a function under Section 31d of the Environment Act 
1986 of "facilitating and encouraging the resolution of conflict in relation to policies and proposals 
which may affect the environment".) The Secretary included representatives of the Ministry of 
Forestry and DSIR as policy advisors, West Coast Timber Assn, Timberlands Ltd (Forestry Corpn), 
Westland County Council and West Coast Regional Development Council, Tourist and Publicity 
Department, Joint Campaign on Native Forests, West Coast United Council, Department of 
Conservation, and the Mahitahi Maori Committee. The mediator chose the participating parties 
with the Objective of having 'all values' represented. 
A meeting was held in Hokitika in March 1987 to determine who ought to be involved. The West 
Coast United Council pointed out that no Maori input had been sought during the earlier 'West 
Coast Accord' process. A Maori representative was appointed to the South Westland south of the 
Cook River Working Party on the advice of the West Coast United Council (who conferred with 
the Mahitahi Maori Committee). 
A representative of Citizens Groups South of the Cook River was belatedly invited to join the 
Working Party. The groups made representations to the Secretary for the Environment pointing 
out the omission of local residents likely to be affected by agreements reached by the Working Party. 
The Working Party followed a five-step approach in its deliberations (Ministry for the Environment, 
1988, p.9). The first three involved a review of existing data and identification of information gaps, 
the distribution of a discussion paper to all households in South Westland from Had Hari to 
Jackson Bay, and public meetings in three communities in August 1987 to allow local people to 
express their concerns and aspirations for the region. Step 4 involved the preparation of a public 
discussion document which included three possible alternative strategies for the allocation and 
management of the State forest. Some 3953 submissions were received in response to the discussion 
document and these formed a key basis of the Working Party's deliberations (ibid., p.5). 
The Working Party met for two or three days approximately every three months over a period of 
around two years. They met to consider key issues, and the Working Party received a summary of 
its deliberations prior to the next meeting. 
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3. The outcome 
The Working Party agreed on a number of key recommendations to be made to Government (ibid.). 
They included management of minerals, agriculture, nature conservation, tourism and recreation, 
fishing, sphagnum moss gathering, community services, and infrastructure. (A South Westland 
Environmental and Community Advisory Group was formed to take responsibility for funding 
allocated over a three-year period for recreation and tourism projects). However, the Working Party 
was unable to reach consensus on the most contentious issues, namely the allocation of State forest 
land for protection or production. The Whataroa timber supply has still not been resolved. 
III. WAITARA WASTEWATER SCHEME 
The original intention was to focus on a mediation process designed to seek and gain statutory 
consents for a new outfall as part of the Waitara wastewater scheme. However, the parties involved 
thought it incongruous to examine what was just one part of a much larger and very complex process 
that has taken place over 20 years and is continuing to evolve. For this reason we have looked at 
the wider decision process to identify issues that are relevant to cross-cultural environmental 
mediation. Processes involved adjudication, negotiation, facilitation and mediation, with a number 
of facilitators or mediators having been involved. 
Further background information on this case can be found in Reynolds (1990, pp.44-47), Kelsey 
(1989, pp.1O-12), National Business Review (1984, pp.15 & 51), Commission for the Environment 
(1983, pp. 138-148), and Coalition for Open Government (1983, pp.I-7, 1984, pp.8-12). 
1, The problem 
Until the early 1970s semi-raw effluent from Borthwicks (known later as Waitaki and now AFFCo) 
freezing works and Waitara Borough wastes were being disposed of into the Waitara River. In 1973 
the Waitara Borough Council was granted a water right to discharge Borough and freezing works 
waste out to sea through a 1200 metre pipeline. The outfall was damaged while being installed 
during a storm (in 1978) and despite repairs being carried out locals remained concerned. 
The Te Atiawa people, one of the Taranaki tribes, were very concerned. Reefs along the Taranaki 
coast from where they collected kai moana were being polluted and they wanted to protect the four 
remaining unpolluted reefs (used by four different hapu, each collecting on their own reef). 
The problem for Te Atiawa was twofold. In addition to being an important source of food, kai 
moana is an integral part of the identity of Te Atiawa. Historically, despite the land confiscations, 
Te Atiawa have always been recognised as the people who had the ability to dress their tables with 
kai moana at large hui held on their marae. They need to be able to practise their cultural values 
within a marae environment. The pollution of kawa affects supply and therefore tribal mana. 
Second, the disposal of human effluent into a food source is grossly offensive to Maori people. 
Despite initial damage caused by the installation of the waste disposal system, the then Taranaki 
Catchment Commission allowed the water right to be renewed in 1978, on the understanding that 
the situation would be monitored. A year or two later proposals were being mooted to establish two 
of the 'Think Big' petrochemical projects in the Waitara locality; a methanol plant and a synthetic 
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fuels plant. People were concerned about the kind of substances that would be disposed of as a 
consequence of petro-chemical processes and how shellfish might be affected. 
New Zealand Synthetic Fuels Corporation Limited (NZSFC) was established in 1980 after a decision 
was made to construct a plant at Motunui. NZSFC applied to the Planning Tribunal for a water 
right to dispose of its wastes. The Petralgas methanol project gained approval in May 1981 and the 
company made a private arrangement to dispose of its industrial wastes through the questionable 
Waitara Borough outfall. 
2. The process 
By June 1981 the Te Atiawa tribe had become so incensed that they lodged a claim with the 
Waitangi Tribunal. The basis of the claim was that Te Atiawa's source of kai moana was being 
polluted, and that they wanted to have full and undisturbed possession of their fisheries. Te Atiawa 
concern increased when the outcome of a long, protracted Planning Tribunal hearing under the 
National Development Act was the granting of a right to NZSFC to discharge through a new outfall 
at Motunui (over the Ngati Rahiri reefs). 
The Waitangi Tribunal findings (1983) challenged the Planning Tribunal decision. The Waitangi 
Tribunal recommended that: 
_ the proposal for a new outfall be discontinued, 
.. an interim arrangement be sought for the discharge of NZSFC plant effluent through the existing 
Waitara Borough outfall, 
.. a Waitara regional wastewater task force be set up to examine the replacement of the existing 
outfall and long-term provision for land-based treatment be carried out, 
... an Interdepartmental Committee be set up to investigate Maori concerns with regard to fishing 
grounds (particularly in relation to outfalls). 
A Task Force and Interdepartmental Committee were set up and in September 1986 they finally 
presented their report. It recommended that the Government subsidise the building of a new 
outfall, possibly extending further out to sea, and all those with waste to dispose would have to fund 
their own land-based treatment. None of the potential users were satisfied with this solution, nor 
were Te Atiawa. 
The Te Atiawa people were in a no-win situation. If they insisted on land rather than marine 
disposal of wastes in accordance with their cultural values (very costly especially with the smallness 
of the ratepayer base that could contribute towards any wastewater scheme, and there was the 
question of whether suitable land was available) then Waitaki International may have been forced 
to close the freezing works. This was of great concern as 50% of employees at the works were Te 
Atiawa people. 
The Government accepted the strategy recommended by the Task Force and extensive negotiations 
between Ministry of Energy (MOE) and the North Taranaki District Council (NTDC) (an 
amalgamation of the Taranaki County Council and the Waitara Borough Council) took place. The 
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Secretary for the Environment took responsibility for overviewing implementation of the 
Government's decisions on the outfall. 
Concern was expressed over the slowness of the negotiations, between MOE and the NTDC, 
particularly because the water right had to be renewed for the existing outfall in 1988. In order to 
speed up the process, the Secretary for the Environment intervened to 'mediate' or expedite a 
satisfactory format for the process of gaining statutory consents for the new outfall. 
In the meantime, the NTDC employed consultants to work on an alternative proposal based on 
upgrading the existing outfall in conjunction with land-based hi-lime treatment. The NTDC played 
an important role in going out to the community for consultation through local networks. A Maori 
liaison committee had been set up to provide input into the new proposal. Te Atiawa had achieved 
some improvement but they were still required to compromise. 
In September 1988 the NTDC approached the Secretaries of Energy and Environment with the 
alternative proposal. In October 1988 the Government announced its decision to broaden the terms 
of reference of the investigation to allow consideration of other options, including the repair of the 
existing outfall. 
3. The outcome 
By December 1988 the Government had decided to proceed with the Waitara Regional Wastewater 
Scheme on the basis of substantially subsidising the upgrading of the existing outfall and secondary 
treatment at the front end of it. The land-based treatment plant is partially completed, and 
upgrading of the existing 1200 m outfall is to start this year (1991). The system eliminates at 
least 99.9% of the pathogens, and the residue goes out to sea. According to a number of the parties 
surrounding issues have still not been satisfactorily resolved. 
87 
Appendix 8. Case study interview questions 
1. Tell me about the 'problem' from your party's perspective; in other words, why was the 
mediator called in? 
2. Why was your group/organisation involved? 
3. Who were the other major parties involved? 
4. Were there any groups that weren't involved that, in retrospect, should have been? 
5. Why, in your view, weren't they included? 
6. How was the representative for your organisation/group chosen? 
7. Was there any disagreement over who should be the representative? 
8. Were there any groups who emerged later claiming that their interests had not been 
represented? 
9. Did you/your representative negotiate/participate in discussions etc. directly or did you have 
legal representation to negotiate on your behalf? 
10. Did you/your representative have the necessary skills to negotiate effectively? 
11. What do you perceive to be the necessary skills your representative needs to negotiate 
effectively on your behalf? 
12. What sort of preliminary discussions went on with your group/organisation and the mediator? 
13. Were opportunities provided for sharing cultural perspectives on the problem and the proposed 
alternatives ? 
14. Were there any protocols set up for meetings/hui that took into account cultural needs? 
15. Describe both positive and negative aspects of this. 
16. Were any funds made available to your group/organisation to help you bring information to the 
discussion table? 
17. Are you able to disclose the source of these funds? 
18. Who do you think should fund this process? 
19. Were meetings/hui held in both offices and on marae? 
20. Describe both positive and negative aspects of this. 
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21. Did all parties meet face-to-face to describe their perspective of the problem and the proposed 
alternatives ? 
22. Were committees, discussion groups, etc. set up to exchange cultural perspectives? 
23. Were objectives set at any stage, or any expression of a desired outcome agreed upon? 
24. Did all parties agree with the final outcome? 
25. Was the outcome satisfactory from your organisation/group's point of view? 
26. Did the 'mediation' process assist significantly in reaching this outcome? 
27. How did you feel about participating in discussions facilitated/mediated by a third party? 
28. Did you think that a (member of the judiciary/civil servant) was a suitable person for this role? 
29. In your view, would the same outcome have been reached if a third party had not been 
involved? 
30. Did the mediator play any part in suggesting alternative courses of action or did he/she simply 
facilitate discussions? 
31. Did the mediator's intervention make any difference in terms of the time and cost involved in 
reaching a decision? 
32. Are there any particular words you think would describe the process? 
33. Were there any aspects of the whole decision process that involved learning about other 
cultural perspectives before/after the mediator's involvement? 
34. Would you be willing to participate in a similar sort of process again? 
35. What are critical factors that should be used to judge the future success of any bicultural 
mediation process? 
36. Anything else I have missed? 
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Additional questions with regard to tangata whenua status: 
37. Who initiated the process? 
38. How were you/your group involved? 
39. Were there any attempts to identify tangata whenua groups by the mediator? 
40. If there were, how much time were you given to do this, and was it sufficient? 
41. If there were, did these attempts work? 
42. If there were no attempts to identify tangata whenua groups by the mediator, what could/should 
have been done? 
43. Did the group/groups that participated attempt to include tangata whenua? 
44. On what grounds? 
45. Do you think it is appropriate for a third party to help establish/discover tangata whenua 
status? 
46. If so, who should do this? 
47. What is your understanding of traditional mediation processes? 
48. Did you try to use them within the case we are looking at now, and if so, did they work? 
49. If you didn't try to use them, how do you think they might have worked? 
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